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INTRODUCTION
1

In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Supreme Court
determined that statutory employment discrimination claims are
2
arbitrable under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) based on a
3
4
mandatory arbitration clause in an employment contract.
Consequently, the circuit courts have extended the Gilmer rationale
beyond the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
5
(“ADEA”) to include Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
6
7
VII”). The Gilmer Court, however, left some questions unanswered.

1. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994). Originally enacted in 1925, see Act of Feb. 12, 1925,
ch. 213, §§ 1-15, 43 Stat. 883, the FAA was codified as Title 9 of the United States
Code in 1947. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16; see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24 (reviewing the history of
the FAA). Section 2 of the FAA states that the purpose of the FAA is to enforce
private contractual agreements to arbitrate: “A written provision in any . . . contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2.
3. An arbitration clause is inserted in a contract to require mandatory
arbitration of any disputes arising under the contract terms. Arbitration refers to
“[a] process of dispute resolution in which a neutral third party (arbitrator) renders
a decision after a hearing at which both parties have an opportunity to be heard.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 105 (6th ed. 1990). See generally FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA
ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS (5th ed. 1997) (providing an overview of
arbitration methods); James B. Dye & Lesly L. Britton, Arbitration by the American
Arbitration Association, 70 N.D. L. REV. 281 (1994) (same). The arbitrator’s decision is
binding on the parties to the contract. See, e.g., DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc.,
121 F.3d 818, 821 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that “‘[a]rbitration awards are subject
to very limited review in order to avoid undermining the twin goals of arbitration,
namely, settling disputes efficiently and avoiding long and expensive litigation’. . . .”)
(quoting Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij BV v. Standard Microsys. Corp., 103 F.3d
9, 12 (2d Cir. 1997)). Reviewing courts will only modify or vacate an arbitration
award in rare instances where the arbitrator showed “manifest disregard for the law.”
DiRussa, 121 F.3d at 821 (citations omitted).
4. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23 (articulating the issue of whether a federal age
discrimination claim could be subject to mandatory arbitration under an arbitration
agreement). The Court held that an ADEA claim can be subject to compulsory
arbitration. Id. at 35. The Supreme Court recently held that mandatory arbitration
clauses are valid even where imposed as a condition of employment because the FAA
exempts only employment contracts of transportation workers. See Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, No. 99-1379, 2001 WL 273205, at *1 (Mar. 21, 2001).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (providing federal statutory
provisions against age discrimination).
6. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at scattered sections of
U.S.C.) (prohibiting unlawful employment discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994) (stating the
purpose of Title VII); id. § 2000e-5 (articulating the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) enforcement powers under Title VII); see also Patterson v.
Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 1997) (extending Gilmer to hold
that Title VII claims are subject to mandatory arbitration); Hurst v. Prudential Sec.,
Inc., 21 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision) (same); Bender v.
A.G. Edwards & Sons, 971 F.2d 698, 700 (11th Cir. 1992) (same); Mago v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1992) (same); Willis v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 308 (6th Cir. 1991) (same); Alford v. Dean Witter
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In particular, the Court did not resolve the scope of remedies
available to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) when it files an independent suit on behalf of an employee
who signed an arbitration agreement, but did not pursue a claim in
8
an arbitral forum.
9
Recently, a circuit split has emerged on this issue. On the one
10
hand, the Sixth Circuit, in EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc.,
held that the EEOC can seek both monetary damages and equitable
relief when it sues on behalf of an employee who signed a mandatory
11
arbitration agreement. The Sixth Circuit recently reaffirmed this
12
holding in EEOC v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. On the other hand, the
Second and Fourth Circuits, have declined to follow the Sixth
13
14
Circuit’s approach.
In EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc. the
Second Circuit held that, under Gilmer, the EEOC can only seek
injunctive relief, not monetary relief, when it files an independent
suit based on the charges of an employee who signed an arbitration
15
agreement.
The Fourth Circuit recently adopted the Second

Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991) (same).
7. See Donald R. Livingston, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and EEOC Enforcement, 23
STETSON L. REV. 53, 93-96 (1993) (discussing issues left unresolved by Gilmer,
including the uncertain effect of the decision on EEOC enforcement powers).
8. See Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment
Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1374 n.99 (1997) (indicating that Gilmer left as an
open question whether a mandatory arbitration agreement precludes the EEOC
from seeking monetary relief on behalf of individual employees).
9. In 1998 and 1999, four cases in three circuit Courts of Appeal addressed the
scope of EEOC remedies in an independent suit on behalf of an employee who
signed a mandatory arbitration agreement. See infra text accompanying notes 10-17
(summarizing the circuits’ positions on the issue). Even though Part III of this
Comment will discuss the substantive holdings of each case in detail, a brief
chronology of this recently emerging case law is as follows: (1) August 28, 1998:
Second Circuit decision in EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir.
1998); (2) April 23, 1999: Sixth Circuit split with Second Circuit in EEOC v. Frank’s
Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999); (3) September 13, 1999: Sixth
Circuit followed Frank’s Nursery in EEOC v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 188 F.3d 695 (6th
Cir. 1999); (4) October 6, 1999: Fourth Circuit followed the Second Circuit
approach in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, No.
99-1823, 2001 WL 285799 (Mar. 26, 2001).
10. 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999).
11. See id. at 468 (reversing the district court’s dismissal of the EEOC’s suit and
reinstating the action to allow EEOC to pursue monetary damages and injunctive
relief).
12. 188 F.3d 695, 701-03 (6th Cir. 1999) (applying Frank’s Nursery in holding that
an arbitration agreement did not interfere with EEOC’s Title VII action).
13. See infra Part II.A (describing the views of the Second and Fourth Circuits
regarding the scope of EEOC remedies and monetary relief).
14. 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998).
15. See id. at 303 (stating that allowing an individual who has consented to an
arbitration agreement “to make an end run around the arbitration agreement by
having the EEOC pursue back pay or liquidated damages on his or her behalf would
undermine the Gilmer decision and the FAA”).
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16

Circuit’s view in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.
This Comment argues that the courts should adopt the Sixth
17
Circuit’s approach.
First, this approach best adheres to
congressional intent as expressed in the statutory language and
18
legislative history of the 1972 Amendments to Title VII, the Civil
19
20
Rights Act of 1991, and the FAA. Second, this approach supports
the purpose of damage remedies to compensate victims and to deter
21
employers from engaging in unlawful employment discrimination.
Third, this approach allows the EEOC to invoke the full range of
statutory remedies, including punitive damages, for egregious or
22
Fourth, the Sixth
repeated acts of intentional discrimination.
Circuit’s approach safeguards against arbitration agreements that do
not permit the employee to obtain the full range of statutory
23
remedies.
Finally, this approach permits the courts to maintain
24
discretion over equitable relief, such as back pay or injunctions.
Contrary to the Second and Fourth Circuits’ reasoning, the Gilmer
decision did not limit the power of the EEOC to seek legal remedies,
such as compensatory damages or punitive damages, or equitable
remedies such as back pay or injunctive relief when the agency files
25
an independent suit. The Sixth Circuit’s view demonstrates that the
resolution of individual claims through private arbitration is
consistent with the enforcement of Title VII through an independent

16. 193 F.3d 805, 812 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, No. 99-1823, 2001 WL 285799
(Mar. 26, 2001) (agreeing with the Second Circuit approach and holding that the
arbitration agreement precluded the EEOC from pursuing remedies of back pay,
reinstatement, and compensatory and punitive damages).
17. See infra Part III.C.
18. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat.
103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994)) (providing statutory
framework to promote equal employment opportunities to American workers).
19. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1998))
(amending Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42
U.S.C. § 12101 (1994), to allow a complaining party to seek compensatory and
punitive damages).
20. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994); see also infra Part IV.C (arguing that the Sixth
Circuit approach is consistent with Title VII, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the
FAA).
21. See infra notes 204-25 and accompanying text (explaining how the Sixth
Circuit approach fulfills purposes of remedies).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 235-48 (discussing how full statutory
remedies are necessary for the EEOC to respond to egregious or repeated acts of
discrimination).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 246-53 (explaining that arbitration
agreements may not provide for full statutory remedies).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 254-59 (arguing that the courts should
retain discretion to fashion equitable relief).
25. See infra notes 37-42, 201 and accompanying text (explaining that Gilmer did
not resolve the issue of the proper scope of EEOC remedies).
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26

EEOC suit that seeks the full range of legal and equitable remedies.
In a recent pronouncement, Congress added compensatory and
punitive damages to Title VII remedies in the Civil Rights Act of
27
1991. In another provision of the Act, Congress also encouraged
28
the use of alternative dispute resolution to resolve employment
29
discrimination claims.
Employers easily could frustrate
congressional intent if they are able to avoid the new damage
remedies added by the 1991 Act simply by putting a mandatory
30
arbitration clause in employees’ contracts.
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the Gilmer
decision, the Title VII statutory scheme, and the purposes of Title VII
remedies. Part III discusses the circuit split on the proper scope of
the EEOC remedies when it files an independent suit on behalf of an
employee who has signed an arbitration agreement. Part IV argues
that the courts should adopt the Sixth Circuit approach, allowing the
EEOC to seek both monetary and injunctive relief. Part V concludes
that the Sixth Circuit approach is fully consistent with Title VII, the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Gilmer decision, and the FAA.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. GILMER AND MANDATORY ARBITRATION UNDER THE FAA
The circuit split over the scope of EEOC remedies arises primarily
from a difference in interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision
31
in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
Prior to Gilmer, it was

26. See infra notes 133-41, 225-27 and accompanying text (explaining the Sixth
Circuit view that the EEOC has the authority to seek full statutory remedies).
27. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-74 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a (1994)) (adding monetary damages to Title VII remedies); see also infra notes
54-56, 210-17 and accompanying text (discussing the new compensatory and punitive
damages remedies added to Title VII by the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
28. Alternative dispute resolution, or “ADR,” refers to a range of techniques used
to resolve disputes without litigation, including arbitration, mediation, mini-trials,
and other methods, typically reducing cost and providing faster resolution than court
litigation. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 4-5 (2d ed.
1991) (discussing movement in the U.S. for alternative forms of dispute resolution,
including initiatives by the American Bar Association); Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties
of Dispute Resolution, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976) (discussing the various methods of
ADR); Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privitization of Justice Through ADR,
11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 241, 247 (1996) (discussing several ADR techniques).
29. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 118 (encouraging the use of alternative means
of dispute resolutions); see also infra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing the
provision of the 1991 Act encouraging alternative dispute resolution).
30. See infra notes 219-22 and accompanying text (explaining how the 1991 Act
provision encouraging arbitration is consistent with the EEOC’s ability to seek full
statutory remedies).
31. 500 U.S. 20 (1991); see also supra note 9 (introducing the circuit split in
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unclear whether statutory claims under anti-discrimination statutes
were subject to mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the
32
non-union context. Gilmer and its progeny resolved this issue by
holding that statutory anti-discrimination claims, including Title VII,
33
were subject to arbitration under the FAA.

interpreting Gilmer). The facts of the Gilmer case involved a securities representative
who had to sign a registration application as a condition of employment in the
securities industry. See id. at 23. The application required arbitration under New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rules for “‘[a]ny controversy between a registered
representative and any member or member organization arising out of the
employment or termination of employment of such registered representative.’” Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting NYSE Rule 347). Gilmer contended that his claim
for unlawful termination under the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998), was not subject to mandatory arbitration. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-27.
32. The pre-Gilmer line of cases indicated that statutory discrimination claims
were not subject to mandatory arbitration in the collective-bargaining or union
context. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974) (holding that
a non-discrimination arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement did not
take away the statutory right of individual employees to file suit in federal court on
Title VII claims). Although the Gardner-Denver Court based its decision in part on the
special conditions present in the collective bargaining context, the Court also stated
that mandatory arbitration was more appropriate to contractual claims than statutory
claims. See id. at 56 (“Arbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of
contractual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the
final resolution of rights created by Title VII.”). After Gardner-Denver, however, the
Court expanded the scope of mandatory arbitration clauses to include statutory
claims. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985) (holding that arbitration of statutory claims is enforceable under the FAA
“unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude waiver of judicial
remedies for the statutory rights at issue”). The Mitsubishi Court held that federal
antitrust claims under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994), were arbitrable
under the FAA. See id. at 640.
33. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35 (finding a lack of congressional intent to preclude
arbitration under these circumstances and thus holding that ADEA claims can be
subject to mandatory arbitration); see also supra note 6 (collecting cases that extended
Gilmer rationale allowing mandatory arbitration of anti-discrimination claims to Title
VII cases). But see Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1202-03 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 982 (1998) (holding that Title VII claims cannot be subject
to compulsory arbitration under a mandatory arbitration clause); U.S. EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, POLICY STATEMENT ON MANDATORY BINDING
ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES AS A CONDITION OF
EMPLOYMENT (1997), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/mandarb.html (last
visited Feb. 16, 2001) (explaining the EEOC’s view that mandatory arbitration
agreements are invalid for Title VII claims). Although Gilmer and its progeny
establish the legitimacy of mandatory arbitration under individual employment
contracts, the Supreme Court thus far has declined to extend the Gilmer rationale to
the collective bargaining context and in the process overturn Gardner-Denver. See
Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 81 (1998) (declining to
resolve the issue of whether a clear and unmistakable waiver of statutory antidiscrimination rights in a collective bargaining agreement could be subject to
mandatory arbitration). But see Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78
F.3d 875, 876, 880-82 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 980 (1996) (relying on Gilmer to
hold that federal statutory rights are subject to compulsory arbitration under the
mandatory arbitration clause of a collective bargaining agreement). See generally
Susan T. Mackenzie & Pearl Zuchlewski, Arbitration and Employment Disputes, in
ARBITRATION NOW: OPPORTUNITIES FOR FAIRNESS, PROCESS RENEWAL AND INVIGORATION
31, 43 (Paul H. Haagen ed., 1999) (noting the uncertainty regarding mandatory
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In reaching its holding, the Gilmer Court reasoned that the purpose
of the FAA, enacted in 1925, was to reverse a trend of judicial hostility
34
toward arbitration. Most importantly, the Gilmer Court recognized
that when an employee agrees to arbitrate, the agreement does not
amount to a waiver of the substantive rights under the statute; rather,
the arbitration agreement is only a waiver of a judicial forum in favor
35
of an arbitral forum. The Court further stated that “‘so long as the
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory
cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve
36
both its remedial and deterrent function.’”
As Part III of this Comment will demonstrate, the circuit split over
EEOC remedies focuses on language in the Gilmer decision. When
plaintiff Gilmer argued that enforcing his arbitration clause would
undermine the EEOC’s enforcement powers, the Court responded
37
that he could still file a charge with the EEOC. Similarly, when
Gilmer contended that the clause was not enforceable because it did
not allow equitable relief, the Court stated, “it should be
remembered that arbitration agreements will not preclude the EEOC
38
from bringing actions seeking class-wide and equitable relief.”
Although the Second and Fourth Circuits rely on this language to
39
justify limiting the EEOC to obtain injunctive relief only, the Gilmer
40
Rather,
court did not determine the scope of EEOC remedies.

arbitration clauses in the collective bargaining context).
34. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35 (stating that the FAA reflects a legislative intent to
promote arbitration agreements). Because the purpose of the FAA was to encourage
the courts to look favorably on agreements to arbitrate, the Gilmer Court articulated a
test to determine whether an agreement should be enforced by the courts:
“‘[H]aving made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless
Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver or judicial remedies for
the statutory rights at issue.’” Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
35. See id. at 26 (“‘[B]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not
forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum.’”) (quoting Mitsubishi, 473
U.S. at 628).
36. Id. at 28 (alteration in original) (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637).
37. See id. at 28 (indicating that the EEOC’s enforcement powers would not be
undermined in Gilmer’s case because “[a]n individual ADEA claimant subject to an
arbitration agreement will still be free to file a charge with the EEOC, even though
the claimant is not able to institute a private judicial action”).
38. Id. at 32.
39. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 811 (4th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, No. 99-1823, 2001 WL 285799 (Mar. 26, 2001) (acknowledging the Supreme
Court’s position in Gilmer that the EEOC acts in a public role and is not bound by
private agreements to arbitrate); EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 302
(2d Cir. 1998) (relying on Gilmer in concluding that “‘arbitration agreements will not
preclude the EEOC from seeking class-wide equitable relief’”) (quoting Gilmer, 500
U.S. at 32).
40. See infra note 201 (collecting sources asserting that the Second Circuit took
Gilmer’s language out of context, and that the Gilmer Court did not resolve the issue
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these statements properly are understood as a response to Gilmer’s
objections to the enforcement of his particular arbitration clause, not
41
as statements of broad application for all EEOC suits. The Gilmer
decision is silent with respect to the remedies available to the EEOC
42
when filing an independent suit.
B. Title VII Statutory Scheme and Remedies
As Part III.B of this Comment will discuss, the Sixth Circuit relied
heavily on Title VII’s statutory scheme when the court held that the
EEOC could seek both monetary and injunctive relief in an
independent suit on behalf of an employee who signed a mandatory
43
arbitration agreement. Title VII does not provide merely for private
suits to enforce the law; rather, the statute provides for dual
enforcement through both private suits by individuals and
44
independent suits by the EEOC.
As originally established, the
EEOC could use only conciliatory efforts to combat employment
45
discrimination. In 1972, however, Congress amended Title VII to

of EEOC remedies).
41. See infra note 202 (describing the debate over whether Gilmer stands for the
proposition that the EEOC is limited to injunctive relief).
42. In addressing other unanswered questions in the post-Gilmer era, the focus of
judicial scrutiny has shifted to whether the arbitral forum provides sufficient
procedural safeguards for employees. Some courts have indicated that arbitration
must include the full range of remedies available under the statute in order to
provide the effective “vindication” of rights envisioned by Gilmer. See Cole v. Burns
Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that an arbitration
agreement should “provide[] for all of the types of relief that would otherwise be
available in court” in order to meet Gilmer’s intention that the plaintiff would be able
to effectively vindicate statutory rights in an arbitral forum); Graham Oil Co. v.
ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1246-48 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that an arbitration
clause that waived federal statutory remedies was unenforceable); DeGaetano v.
Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 459, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (refusing to enforce the
portion of an arbitration agreement which did not allow the remedy of attorneys fees
that would have been available in court); Richard A. Bales, Creating and Challenging
Compulsory Arbitration Agreements, 13 LAB. LAW. 511, 541-44 (1998) (interpreting the
Gilmer statement that arbitration does not constitute a waiver of substantive rights to
mean that limitations on remedies available in arbitration are increasingly subject to
attack); Michael Delikat & René Kathawala, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Claims Under Pre-Dispute Agreements: Will Gilmer Survive?, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMPLOYMENT L.J. 83, 92-93 (1998) (arguing that courts in the post-Gilmer era are
likely to invalidate an arbitration agreement if it does not provide full statutory
remedies).
43. See also infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text (explaining the Sixth
Circuit’s analysis of the Title VII statutory scheme).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) to (k) (1994) (articulating the EEOC’s
enforcement powers under Title VII to prevent employment discrimination);
§ 2000e-5(f)(1) (1994) (authorizing suits by both the EEOC and private individuals
to enforce Title VII).
45. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(e), 78 Stat. 241, 258-59
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1994)) (“The Commission shall
have power . . . to assist in such effectuation by conciliation or such other remedial
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expand the authority of the EEOC, granting it the power to file its
46
own independent civil action.
Under the original Title VII statute, the complaining party could
47
seek specified types of relief. The statute provided the following
48
injunction from engaging in unlawful
equitable remedies:
49
employment practices, an order of affirmative action such as

action as is provided by this title . . . .”). Under the original act, if the EEOC failed to
succeed in conciliation, the agency’s role ended, allowing only the charging party to
file a claim in federal court. See id. § 706(e) (providing that if the Commission is
unable to obtain compliance with the title, a civil action may be brought by the
aggrieved person); EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 456-57 (6th
Cir. 1999) (explaining the EEOC’s limited role under the original Title VII statute).
46. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4a, 86
Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1994)) (providing that if the EEOC is
unable to secure voluntary compliance from the employer, EEOC may bring a civil
action). Congress strengthened the EEOC’s enforcement powers because “failure to
grant the EEOC meaningful enforcement powers ha[d] proven to be a major flaw in
the operation of Title VII.” Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 325 (1980)
(quoting S. REP. NO. 92-415, at 4 (1971)). Congress decided that it was crucial that
“effective enforcement procedures be provided the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission to strengthen its efforts to reduce discrimination in employment.” H.
REP. NO. 92-238, at 3 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2139, quoted in
Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 457.
Under the amended statutory scheme, first, the aggrieved employee must file a
charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory occurrence. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (laying out the procedural framework of filing a charge with
the EEOC). The EEOC then issues notice to the party charged and conducts an
investigation. See id. § 2000e-5(b) (describing in detail actions that EEOC must
undertake when an aggrieved employee files a charge). The purpose of the
investigation is to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the
charge of discrimination is true. Cf. id. (stating the EEOC is to dismiss the charge if
“there is no[] reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true,” and empowering
the Commission to attempt to eliminate the unlawful practice if the charge appears
true). When the EEOC finds reasonable cause, the agency tries to resolve the matter
through “conference, conciliation, and persuasion.” Id. If the EEOC cannot resolve
the charge through conciliation, it may initiate a civil action in federal court. See id.
§ 2000e-5(f)(1). Aggrieved persons have a right to intervene in the EEOC’s civil
action. See id. If the EEOC does not file a civil action within 180 days of the initial
charge, the EEOC may issue a “right to sue” letter to the aggrieved party, who may
then file a private suit in federal court within 90 days. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (1999)
(delineating EEOC regulations on issuing right to sue letter); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(1) (requiring the Commission to notify the aggrieved person that the
Commission has not brought an action). The EEOC also may intervene in an
individual suit. See id. (stating that the court has discretion to allow the Commission
to intervene if “the case is of general public importance”).
47. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(g), 78 Stat. 241, 261
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994)) (listing possible remedies if the court
finds the employer engaged in unlawful employment practices intentionally).
48. Equitable relief, issued by the court under the equitable principle of fairness,
usually includes injunction or specific performance and is distinct from money
damages. See generally DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.1(2)
(1973) (indicating that equitable remedies are intended to coerce action, to provide
restitution, or to issue a declaratory order).
49. The injunction is an equitable remedy ordering or prohibiting a specific act.
See generally DOBBS, supra note 48, § 2.9(1) (defining injunction as an in personam
order directing the defendant to act or to refrain from acting in a specified way that
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50

reinstatement or hiring, back pay, or other equitable relief as
51
determined by the court. In addition, Congress passed the Civil
52
Rights Act of 1991, adding money damages to Title VII remedies to
53
further deter employment discrimination. In cases of intentional
discrimination, Congress enhanced the scope of remedies to include
54
55
compensatory and punitive damages. The 1991 Act specifies caps

is enforceable by the contempt power); id. § 7.4 (explaining that the injunctive
remedy is used extensively in civil rights cases to provide specific relief to individuals
and groups).
50. Although a type of monetary relief, back pay is an equitable remedy, defined
as the “the total compensation the employee has lost from the date of the adverse
employment decision through the date of final judgment.” HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR.,
CIVIL RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 5.10 (1997). Because of its
equitable character, the court determines whether a back pay award should be
granted. See id. But see infra note 57 (explaining that under the Civil Rights Act of
1991, the plaintiff can request a jury trial when the complaint seeks compensatory or
punitive damages). The purpose of back pay is to “make whole” the victim of
unlawful employment discrimination. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 421 (1975) (recognizing that denial of back pay frustrates the central purposes
of Title VII—the “make whole” purpose and “eradicating discrimination throughout
the economy”).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5g (1994) (providing guidelines for the court for
fashioning remedies). See generally LEWIS, supra note 50, § 5.10 (providing an
overview of various equitable remedies for Title VII violations); TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, THEORIES
OF DISCRIMINATION A-2 to A-3 (1995) (describing possible Title VII remedies).
52. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-74 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a (1994)) (amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (1994) (Congressional Findings) (providing for
damages in intentional discrimination cases in response to findings that additional
remedies are necessary to prevent harassment and intentional discrimination). The
expansion of remedies available under Title VII was based on the congressional
finding that “additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful
harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace.” Id.; see also infra notes
204-20, 235-48 and accompanying text (discussing in detail how the Sixth Circuit
approach gives effect to the purposes of the money damage remedies recently added
to the Title VII statute).
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2) (allowing recovery of compensatory damages and
excluding back pay and interest on back pay from compensatory damages); id.
§ 1981a(b)(3) (imposing limitations on the amount of compensatory damages the
plaintiff can recover). Compensatory damages are available in cases of intentional
discrimination under Title VII for pecuniary losses (including past and future out-ofpocket expenses) and non-pecuniary losses suffered because of discrimination. See
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, supra note 51, at A-2 (defining compensatory
damages). Compensatory damages for pecuniary losses include expenses for medical
care, moving, job searches, or physical therapy. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
AVAILABLE UNDER SECTION 102 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 8 (1992) [hereinafter
EEOC DAMAGES GUIDANCE]. Compensatory damages for non-pecuniary losses
compensate the victim for intangible injuries, such as emotional pain, loss of
enjoyment of life, and injury to reputation or professional standing. See id. at 10.
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (allowing recovery of punitive damages in certain
cases brought under Title VII). Punitive damages are available in cases of intentional
discrimination under Title VII where the employer acted with “malice or with
reckless indifference” to the employee’s federally protected rights. EEOC DAMAGES
GUIDANCE, supra note 54, at 15; see also H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 72 (1991), reprinted
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56

on combined compensatory and punitive damages awarded by a
57
jury.
The three circuit courts that have addressed the proper scope of
EEOC remedies in an independent suit on behalf of an employee
who signed a mandatory arbitration agreement have considered the
purposes of federal anti-discrimination statutes, the language of
Gilmer, and the purpose of the FAA to enforce contractual
58
agreements to arbitrate. As Part III of this Comment will discuss,
the Second and Fourth Circuits favor the FAA in their analyses of
statutory anti-discrimination claims, contending that an arbitration
59
agreement limits EEOC remedies to injunctive relief. The Sixth
Circuit argues, however, that the EEOC’s right to seek a full range of
60
remedies is not inconsistent with the FAA.
In fact, the Sixth
Circuit’s solution provides the best implementation of the 1972
amendments to Title VII, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the

in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 610 (stating that to receive punitive damages under Title
VII, a plaintiff “must first prove intentional discrimination, then must prove actual
injury or loss arising therefrom to recover compensatory damages, and must meet an
even higher standard (establishing that the employer acted with malice or reckless or
callous indifference to their rights) to recover punitive damages”). See generally
LEWIS, supra note 50, § 5.11 (describing application of the malice or reckless
indifference standard for punitive damages).
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (imposing limitations on the sum of
compensatory and punitive money damages based on the number of employees in
the workplace); see also EEOC DAMAGES GUIDANCE, supra note 54, at 14, 18
(explaining that punitive and compensatory damages under Title VII are determined
by a jury, but cannot exceed the caps on damages delineated in section 1981a(b)(3),
preventing excessive damage awards).
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (allowing any party to demand a jury trial when
seeking money damages under the 1991 Act). The purpose of the jury award of
punitive damages is to punish and deter unlawful employment discrimination. See
City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 575 (1986) (stating that “the damages a
plaintiff recovers contribute[] significantly to the deterrence of civil rights violations
in the future”); see also Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 221 (2d Cir. 1997)
(stating that punitive damages are determined by the jury based on the amount
necessary to punish the defendant for its conduct and to deter the defendant and
other employers from engaging in such activity).
58. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 812 (4th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, No. 99-1823, 2001 WL 285799 (Mar. 26, 2001) (balancing the policies
implicated by Gilmer, the federal discrimination statutes and the federal policy
favoring arbitration); EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 470-71
(6th Cir. 1999) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (noting the clash of philosophical interests
between the visions of public good contained in Title VII (promoting collective
public interests) and the FAA (promoting individual right to contract)); EEOC v.
Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1998) (indicating the need to
strike a balance between the competing public interests of eliminating employment
discrimination and encouraging enforcement of arbitration agreements under the
FAA).
59. See infra Part II.A (discussing the Second and Fourth Circuit cases holding
that the EEOC can seek only injunctive relief).
60. See infra note 201 and accompanying text (explaining that the Sixth Circuit
approach does not undermine Gilmer or the FAA).
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61

purposes of Title VII remedies.

II. CIRCUIT SPLIT ON SCOPE OF EEOC REMEDIES AND
MONETARY RELIEF
Four recent cases have focused on whether the EEOC may seek
monetary relief in an independent suit where the aggrieved employee
62
signed a mandatory arbitration agreement. Two options emerge
regarding the proper scope of EEOC remedies. The EEOC should
be able to seek: (1) only injunctive relief, or (2) both monetary and
63
injunctive relief.
A. Only Injunctive Relief
Second Circuit: EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.
The Second Circuit first addressed this issue in EEOC v. Kidder,
64
Peabody & Co. when it held that the EEOC could seek only injunctive
relief on behalf of employees who signed a mandatory arbitration
65
clause.
In Kidder, Peabody, the EEOC brought suit for back pay,
liquidated damages, and reinstatement on behalf of seventeen
investment bankers under the Age Discrimination in Employment
66
Act (ADEA).
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s
1.


61. See infra Part III.C (explaining why the Sixth Circuit approach provides the
best solution to implement the purposes of Title VII).
62. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, No.
99-1823, 2001 WL 285799 (Mar. 26, 2001); EEOC v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 188
F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery and Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448 (4th
Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998); see also
supra note 9 (outlining the chronology of these cases).
63. A third option, allowing the EEOC to seek neither monetary nor injunctive
relief, was adopted by the district court in Frank’s Nursery. EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery &
Crafts, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 500, 505-06 (E.D. Mich. 1997), rev’d, 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir.
1999). The Sixth Circuit, however, rejected this approach, holding that the district
court erred in finding that the EEOC could not base its claim for injunctive relief on
a charge filed by one individual. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 468 (finding that
EEOC can seek equitable relief for a class without citing numerous examples of
discrimination); see also infra note 78 (explaining that the EEOC can seek injunctive
relief by proving discrimination against one employee). Both the Second Circuit and
the Fourth Circuit agree that the EEOC may seek injunctive relief based on charges
filed by one employee who signed an arbitration agreement. See infra Part III.A
(explaining the Second and Fourth Circuit’s rationales for allowing the EEOC to
seek injunctive relief).
64. 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998), aff’g 979 F. Supp. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
65. See id. at 303 (holding public interests support allowing the EEOC to seek
injunctive remedies, but that allowing monetary relief damages would undermine
the FAA).
66. See id. See generally Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621634 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (prohibiting arbitrary age discrimination in
employment practices). The bankers had signed a securities “U-4” registration form,
which contained a mandatory arbitration clause agreeing to submit “any and all

TABERPP.DOC

2000]

8/15/2001 11:32 AM

MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND EEOC REMEDIES

293

dismissal, holding that a mandatory arbitration agreement precludes
the EEOC from seeking purely monetary relief on behalf of an
67
employee under the ADEA.
68
First, relying in part on Gilmer, the Kidder, Peabody court
analogized an arbitration agreement with an individual’s prior
litigation, settlement, or waiver of a claim, all of which prevent the
69
EEOC from suing for monetary damages. Applying the doctrine of
70
res judicata, courts have held that prior litigation, whether
successful or not, precludes EEOC action for monetary relief on
71
behalf of the individual in a subsequent suit. Similarly, relying on

claims arising out of their employment with Kidder” to binding arbitration. Kidder,
Peabody, 156 F.3d at 300. During the litigation, Kidder, Peabody & Co. ceased its
investment banking operations, and the EEOC dropped its request for injunctive
relief. See id. The EEOC proceeded with the case for back pay and liquidated
damages on behalf of nine of the seventeen bankers. See id. (noting that only these
nine employees signed an arbitration form upon their employment with Kidder,
Peabody). With only monetary relief remaining, the defendant moved to dismiss the
case. See id. (arguing that previous arbitration agreements precluded the EEOC’s
suit for monetary damages and back pay).
67. See Kidder, Peabody, 156 F.3d at 303 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of
the case).
68. See id. at 301 (using settlement cases cited in Gilmer) (citing Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991)). The Gilmer Court
recognized that the EEOC did not have to be involved in the resolution of all
employment discrimination claims, providing as examples three cases holding that
prior settlement or waiver of a claim by an aggrieved employee would preclude the
EEOC from seeking relief on behalf of that individual in a subsequent suit. See
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28 (stating that nothing in the ADEA shows Congress meant for
the EEOC to be involved in all employment suits); see also Coventry v. United States
Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 518 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding that under contract principles,
an employee may release all personal ADEA claims or claims on his or her behalf in a
private settlement); Moore v. McGraw Edison Co., 804 F.2d 1026, 1033 (8th Cir.
1986) (finding that an employee may validly waive a cause of action under the ADEA
in a private, unsupervised release in exchange for severance pay); Runyan v. Nat’l
Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1044-45 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that an
unsupervised release of an ADEA claim is valid).
69. See Kidder, Peabody, 156 F.3d at 301 (noting that courts have held that EEOC
“may not seek monetary relief in the name of an employee who has waived, settled or
previously litigated the claim”). But see Estreicher, supra note 8, at 1374 & nn.98-99
(disagreeing that Gilmer stands for the proposition that arbitration agreements
preempt EEOC actions for monetary relief). Comparing Kidder, Peabody with the
language in Gilmer, Estreicher suggests that although Gilmer did not preclude the
EEOC from seeking equitable, class-wide relief, it did not resolve the issue of whether
a mandatory arbitration agreement would preempt the EEOC from seeking
monetary relief on behalf of employees who signed arbitration agreements. See id. at
n.99.
70. Federal res judicata, or claim preclusion, includes three required elements:
(1) a final judgment on the merits in earlier action, (2) an identity of same cause of
action in previous and subsequent suit, and (3) an identity of same parties or privies
in both suits. See EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286, 1289 (7th Cir. 1993)
(outlining the three elements of res judicata in addressing the EEOC argument that
it was not in privity with the plaintiff, and, thus, is not barred by the judgment against
the plaintiff).
71. See id. at 1290-91 (holding that prior litigation, including dismissal of an
employee’s ADEA lawsuit as barred by the statute of limitations, had a res judicata
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73

principles of mootness and res judicata, courts have held that an
employee’s previous settlement has a preclusive effect on the EEOC’s
74
75
ability to seek monetary relief. Finally, under waiver principles,
employees can waive not only their individual claims for monetary
relief, but also the right of the EEOC to sue for monetary relief on
76
their behalf. On the other hand, an employee may not waive the
77
right to file an EEOC charge. In addition, the same courts have

effect on a subsequent EEOC lawsuit, precluding the EEOC from seeking individual
relief such as back pay and liquidated damages); EEOC v. United States Steel Corp.,
921 F.2d 489, 496-97 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding that an employee’s unsuccessful ADEA
law suit before a jury precluded subsequent EEOC action for pension benefits for the
employee).
72. An action is rendered moot if the issues are no longer live or if the parties fail
to have a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. See EEOC v. Goodyear
Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d 1539, 1542-43 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that even when the
EEOC filed its suit first, a subsequent settlement by the employee of her Title VII
claims rendered moot the EEOC’s back pay claim on her behalf).
73. See New Orleans Steamship Ass’n v. EEOC, 680 F.2d 23, 25 (5th Cir. 1982)
(reviewing the effect of Title VII settlement by consent decree on a subsequent
EEOC action, and stating that “the EEOC may challenge a transaction which was the
subject of prior judicial scrutiny in a private suit, if the subsequent challenge seeks
different relief”); Truvillion v. King’s Daughter’s Hosp., 614 F.2d 520, 525 (5th Cir.
1980) (“[T]he E.E.O.C. may not bring a second suit based on the transactions that
were the subject of a prior suit by a private plaintiff, unless the E.E.O.C. seeks relief
different from that sought by the individual.”); EEOC v. McLean Trucking Co., 525
F.2d 1007, 1011 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that an employee’s private settlement
agreement in which he waived back pay claims under Title VII barred the employee
from recovering any “private benefit” such as back pay in a subsequent independent
EEOC suit). But see EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1361 (6th Cir.
1975) (“[T]he EEOC is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata from basing its
complaint on charges of discrimination which it never agreed to settle.”).
74. See, e.g., EEOC v. Harvey L. Walner & Assocs., 91 F.3d 963, 969 (7th Cir.
1996) (explaining that settlement agreements often require the employee to waive
their individual claims to relief).
75. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191 (1957) (stating that a waiver in
the settlement context “connotes some kind of voluntary knowing relinquishment of
a right”).
76. See supra note 68 (discussing cases cited in Gilmer, which hold that the
aggrieved employee’s prior waiver or settlement of a claim precludes the EEOC from
seeking monetary relief in an independent suit); see also EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821
F.2d 1085, 1091 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he employee can waive not only the right to
recover in his or her own lawsuit but also the right to recover in a suit brought by the
EEOC on the employee’s behalf.”). Under contract principles, the waiver must be
knowing and voluntary. See Coventry v. United States Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 522
(3d Cir. 1988) (finding that waiver of ADEA and Title VII claims must be made
knowingly and willfully); Cosmair, 821 F.2d at 1091 (finding that “[a] private,
unsupervised waiver of an ADEA cause of action by an employee is valid as long as it
is voluntary and knowing”); see also Runyan v. Nat’l Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d
1039, 1044 (6th Cir. 1986) (encouraging the application of contract principles in
determining whether the plaintiff waived his ADEA claims knowingly and
voluntarily).
77. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (stating
that even though an employee who signed an arbitration agreement can be
compelled to resolve claims in arbitration, the employee is still free to file a charge of
employment discrimination with the EEOC); Cosmair, 821 F.2d at 1090 (finding that
a waiver of the right to file a charge with the EEOC is void as against public policy);
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held that prior litigation, settlement, or waiver does not preclude
subsequent EEOC suits for injunctive relief to prevent further
78
As Part IV of this
violations of an anti-discrimination statute.
Comment will argue, however, Gilmer did not hold that the mere
existence of a mandatory arbitration agreement should have the
79
same preclusive effect as prior litigation, settlement or waiver. The
Kidder, Peabody court’s analogy is inappropriate when an employee
80
has not previously arbitrated a claim.
Second, the Kidder, Peabody court relied on the FAA and its liberal
81
The
policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements.
Second Circuit concluded that it would undermine the FAA if the
EEOC could seek monetary relief on behalf of employees who had
82
agreed to arbitrate their claims.
In his concurring opinion,

EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 744 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that an agreement
not to assist in an EEOC investigation is void).
78. See EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993)
(holding that the EEOC has an independent right to sue for injunctive relief under
Title VII “to vindicate the public interest in preventing employment
discrimination . . . .”) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980));
EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., 860 F.2d 372, 375-76 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that an
employee’s private settlement of a Title VII claim after the EEOC filed suit does not
moot the EEOC’s right of action for injunctive relief on behalf of a class of
individuals in the public interest); EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d
1539, 1543 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that an employee’s private settlement of Title VII
claim “does not moot the EEOC’s right of action seeking injunctive relief to protect
employees as a class and to deter the employer from discrimination”); New Orleans
Steamship Ass’n v. EEOC, 680 F.2d 23, 25-26 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that res
judicata does not preclude EEOC suit for injunctive relief); EEOC v. McLean
Trucking Co., 525 F.2d 1007, 1010 (6th Cir. 1975) (finding that res judicata does not
bar EEOC from seeking injunctive relief). Furthermore, the EEOC can base its claim
for injunctive relief on only one charge of discrimination. See id. (explaining that
there was only one charge on which the EEOC could bring the case). Compare
General Tel., 446 U.S. at 323-24 (finding that the EEOC has an independent authority
under Title VII to obtain injunctive relief on behalf of a class of employees by
proving discrimination against just one employee and without being certified as a
class representative under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), with FED.
R. CIV. P. 23(a) (requiring a numerous class, common questions of law or fact,
typical claims or defenses, and adequacy of representation as prerequisites to
certification as a class representative).
79. See infra text accompanying notes 251-53 and accompanying text (critiquing
analogy that an arbitration agreement has the same preclusive effect as prior
litigation, settlement, or waiver).
80. See infra text accompanying notes 251-53.
81. See EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 302 (2d Cir. 1998)
(quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983))
(concluding that when an individual freely arbitrates an ADEA claim, the EEOC
cannot pursue monetary remedies on that individual’s behalf). In Cone Memorial
Hospital, the Supreme Court said that, “[t]he Arbitration Act establishes that, as a
matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration . . . .” 460 U.S. at 24-25.
82. See Kidder, Peabody, 156 F.3d at 303 (concluding that “[t]o permit an
individual, who has freely agreed to arbitrate all employment claims, to make an end
run around the arbitration agreement by having the EEOC pursue back pay or
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however, Judge Feinberg disagreed with this characterization, stating
that monetary relief sought by the EEOC would not undermine the
83
FAA unduly. Judge Feinberg explained that EEOC resources are
limited, and the agency would not “pursue monetary damages simply
84
to accommodate employees seeking to avoid arbitration.”
Third, the Second Circuit held that the EEOC still could seek
injunctive relief on behalf of employees who signed binding
85
86
arbitration agreements. Relying on language in Gilmer, the court
reasoned that an injunction is the proper remedy when the EEOC
87
seeks to protect public rights.
Moreover, the court rejected the
contention that injunctive relief alone would have less deterrent
88
value to employers.
Again, Judge Feinberg disagreed with the
majority’s assumption that the deterrent value of an arbitration award
89
is equal to the deterrent value of monetary relief in an EEOC action.
Judge Feinberg stated, “On the contrary, I find it eminently plausible
that the risk of a single, large award in an EEOC case brought on
behalf of multiple employees would be a greater deterrent to illegal

liquidated damages on his or her behalf would undermine the Gilmer decision and
the FAA”); see also EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 979 F. Supp. 245, 247 (S.D.N.Y.
1997), aff’d, 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998) (“It would frustrate the purposes of the FAA
if the Court allowed the EEOC to recover monetary relief where parties have agreed
to arbitrate their grievances.”).
83. See Kidder, Peabody, 156 F.3d at 304 (Feinberg, J., concurring) (disagreeing
with the majority that allowing the EEOC to pursue monetary relief despite the
presence of a valid arbitration agreement would be a way around the arbitration
agreement); see also infra notes 225-34 and accompanying text (explaining the Sixth
Circuit view that allowing the EEOC to seek monetary relief does not undermine the
FAA).
84. See Kidder, Peabody, 156 F.3d at 304 (Feinberg, J., concurring) (emphasizing
that because of these limited resources, most employees who submit to arbitration
will not benefit from the EEOC involvement).
85. See id. at 303 (agreeing with the lower court that allowing the EEOC to
pursue injunctive relief and promoting arbitration of the employee’s claim strikes
the correct balance of interests).
86. See Kidder, Peabody, 156 F.3d at 301 (“‘[A]rbitration agreements will not
preclude the EEOC from bringing actions seeking class-wide or equitable relief’”)
(quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Law Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991)); see also
supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (describing the context of the language in
the Gilmer decision relied on by the Second Circuit to limit the EEOC to injunctive
relief). But see infra note 201 (rebutting the premise that the Gilmer stands for the
proposition that the EEOC is limited to seeking injunctive relief on behalf of an
employee who signed a mandatory arbitration clause).
87. See Kidder, Peabody, 156 F.3d at 302 (stating that “where an individual has
freely contracted away, waived, or unsuccessfully litigated a claim, ‘the public interest
in a back pay award is minimal . . . . ’”) (quoting EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp.,
813 F.2d 1539, 1543 (1987)).
88. See id. at 303 (“We see no reason to believe that the threat of an award of
monetary damages obtained by a private individual through arbitration has any less
deterrent value than the threat of an award of monetary damage obtained by the
EEOC.”).
89. Id. at 304 (Feinberg, J., concurring).
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conduct than the risk of multiple smaller awards obtained by the
90
employees through arbitration . . . .”
Therefore, the Second Circuit held that limiting the EEOC to
injunctive relief strikes the proper balance between competing
interests—the EEOC’s role in protecting the public interest against
discrimination and the FAA’s role in encouraging enforcement of
91
private arbitration agreements.
Fourth Circuit: EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.
92
A recent Fourth Circuit case, EEOC v. Waffle House Inc., adopted
93
the Second Circuit’s analysis in Kidder, Peabody. Like Kidder, Peabody,
Waffle House held that an employee’s waiver of a judicial forum for
statutory claims in a mandatory arbitration clause precludes the
EEOC from seeking monetary relief on the employee’s behalf, but
94
does not bar injunctive relief.
In Waffle House, the EEOC brought suit under the Americans with
95
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and section 102 of the Civil Rights
96
Act of 1991 against Waffle House restaurant for unlawful
termination of Eric Baker, an epileptic employee who had a seizure at
97
work. The EEOC sought the following remedies: (1) a permanent
injunction against Waffle House prohibiting disability discrimination,
2.


90. Id.; see also infra notes 208-10 (explaining that arbitration awards are usually
smaller than litigation judgments, reducing the deterrent effect). Judge Feinberg
also expressed “grave doubt” that statutory rights are equally vindicated in
arbitration. See Kidder, Peabody, 156 F.3d at 304 (Feinberg, J., concurring) (doubting
the Gilmer assumption that rights can be well-vindicated in arbitration); see also
Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 203-04 (2d Cir. 1998) (overturning an
arbitration award because of the arbitrator’s manifest disregard for the law, and
emphasizing the need for procedural safeguards necessary to ensure effective
vindication of statutory rights in arbitration); DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc.,
121 F.3d 818, 823 (2d Cir. 1997) (upholding an arbitration decision, but noting that
the plaintiff’s rights under the ADEA may not be equally vindicated in arbitration
because arbitrators in the securities industry do not have to award attorneys fees, a
remedy provided for in the ADEA statute).
91. See Kidder, Peabody, 156 F.3d at 303 (delineating these competing public
interests); see also EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993)
(finding that when an employee has previously litigated an ADEA claim, the EEOC
can adequately protect the public interest against employment discrimination
through the injunction remedy).
92. 193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, No. 99-1823, 2001 WL 285799
(Mar. 26, 2001).
93. 156 F.3d at 301-02 (allowing the EEOC to seek injunctive relief).
94. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 813 (explaining that although the EEOC may not
have been able to pursue the individual’s remedies in court because of a prior
arbitration agreement, it could still pursue injunctive relief).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994).
96. Id. § 1981a.
97. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 807 (noting that Eric Baker was discharged
shortly after a seizure at work).
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(2) a court order that Waffle House implement anti-discrimination
programs, (3) back pay and reinstatement, (4) compensatory
98
Baker had signed an
damages, and (5) punitive damages.
99
employment application containing a mandatory arbitration clause.
Waffle House moved to compel arbitration against the EEOC under
100
101
the FAA, arguing that the EEOC should arbitrate Baker’s claims.
The district court denied the motion, finding the clause
102
unenforceable.
On interlocutory appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that
103
the arbitration agreement was enforceable, and proceeded to the
issues of (1) whether the EEOC should be required to arbitrate on
104
behalf of Baker and (2) the EEOC’s remedies.
First, the court
correctly held that Waffle House could not compel the EEOC to
105
arbitrate Baker’s claims. Drawing on the statutory scheme of Title

98. See id. at 807-08 (noting that the EEOC sought these remedies in order to
cure Waffle House’s allegedly unlawful employment practices and to provide the
employee with appropriate relief).
99. See id. at 807. The clause provided for arbitration of “any dispute or claim
concerning Applicant’s employment with Waffle House, Inc., or any subsidiary or
Franchisee of Waffle House, Inc., or the terms, conditions or benefits of such
employment.” Id.
100. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (“A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal
of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any
United States district court . . . in a civil action . . . for an order directing that such
arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such an agreement.”).
101. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 808 (describing Waffle House’s motion to
compel arbitration and, in the alternative, to dismiss the action).
102. See id. (district court opinion not reported) (noting the district court’s
reasoning that because Baker signed an application at a different Waffle House
location from the one from where he was fired, the binding arbitration clause was
unenforceable by the Waffle House where Baker was actually working).
103. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 809 (concluding that the employment
application formed a binding arbitration agreement because the application was a
“corporation-wide” document, the provisions of which would be enforceable
wherever Baker was hired in the Waffle House corporation). Judge King dissented,
arguing that under contract principles, no agreement to arbitrate existed between
Baker and Waffle House. See id. at 813-16 (King, J., dissenting) (disagreeing that an
employment agreement was made because Baker did not accept the job offered at
the first restaurant).
104. See id. at 808 (introducing the issue of whether the EEOC could maintain an
independent suit after ruling that Baker’s arbitration agreement was enforceable).
105. See id. at 811-12 (stating that Congress established dual enforcement system
of the ADA, and thus, EEOC cannot be compelled to arbitrate as it is not the
“surrogate” for the aggrieved party). Referring to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in
EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999), which held that
the EEOC can seek both monetary damages and equitable relief on behalf of an
employee who had signed a mandatory arbitration agreement, and the Second
Circuit’s decision in EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998),
which held that the EEOC can only seek injunctive relief on behalf of an employee
who had signed a mandatory arbitration agreement, the Fourth Circuit noted that
“neither of the other two circuits that have addressed the question of the impact of a
private arbitration agreement on the EEOC’s ability to sue in its own name have
concluded that such an agreement permits a court to force the EEOC into
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VII under the 1972 Amendments, incorporated by reference into the
106
ADA, the court determined that the EEOC has an independent
107
right to sue. In addition, the court explained that, under contract
principles, it could not compel the agency to arbitrate because the
108
EEOC was not a party to the arbitration agreement.
Second, the court addressed the effect of Baker’s arbitration
109
Relying on the FAA,
agreement on the scope of EEOC remedies.
the court stated that a precedent that permitted the EEOC to seek
monetary damages would undermine the strong federal policy in
110
favor of arbitration. The Waffle House Court expressly adopted the
Second Circuit’s balancing test when it weighed the federal interest
in enforcing arbitration agreements against the EEOC’s interest in
111
suing employers who discriminate in the workplace.
The court
reasoned that when the EEOC seeks monetary relief, including back
pay, compensatory, and punitive damages, on behalf of a party in an
112
arbitration agreement, “the EEOC’s public interest is minimal.” In
such cases, the balancing test favors the FAA, and the EEOC should
113
be bound to the individual’s agreement to arbitrate.
In contrast,
when the EEOC seeks broad injunctive relief, the balance weighs in

arbitration under the FAA.” Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 811.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994) (incorporating by reference 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-49).
107. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 809 (reviewing the history of the ADA and the
legislative history of the 1972 Amendments to Title VII); id. (“In enforcing the
federal anti-discrimination laws, the EEOC does not act merely as a proxy for the
charging party but rather seeks to ‘advance the public interest in preventing and
remedying employment discrimination’ . . . .The EEOC’s independent authority . . . is clear.”) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 331 (1980)).
108. See id. at 809 (agreeing with the EEOC claim that it is not bound by the
arbitration clause). The Supreme Court requires that courts interpret an arbitration
agreement as a contract. See AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am.,
475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (stating that arbitration is a contractual matter, and thus,
one cannot be forced to arbitrate a dispute if he was not a party to the contract).
109. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 812 (discussing the important role of the EEOC
in effectively addressing workplace discrimination while recognizing the strong
policy interests in enforcing arbitration agreements).
110. See id. (“To permit the EEOC to prosecute in court Baker’s individual claim—
the resolution of which he had earlier committed by contract to the arbitral forum-–
would significantly trample this strong federal policy favoring arbitration.”); see also 9
U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (promoting enforcement of private agreements to arbitrate).
111. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 812 (recognizing the competing interests and
approving of the balance struck by Kidder, Peabody); see also supra notes 68-90
(describing the Second Circuit’s rationale in relying on the text of Gilmer and
balancing competing interests between the FAA and the enforcement powers of the
EEOC).
112. Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 812 (agreeing with the Second Circuit’s reasoning).
113. See id. at 813 (“We . . . hold that when the EEOC enforces the individual
rights of Baker by seeking back pay, reinstatement, and compensatory and punitive
damages, it must recognize Baker’s prior agreement to adjudicate those rights in the
arbitral forum”).
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favor of the EEOC’s capacity to protect the public interest.
Therefore, the Waffle House Court concluded that if an employee
signs an arbitration agreement, the EEOC may seek only injunctive
115
relief.
Both the Second and Fourth Circuits base their analyses on Gilmer
and the FAA, reasoning that under the liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration, an arbitration agreement, like a prior settlement or
waiver, has a preclusive effect on the EEOC’s ability to seek monetary
116
relief.
B. Both Monetary and Injunctive Relief
1. Sixth Circuit: EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc.
117

In EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., the Sixth Circuit
declined to adopt the Second Circuit’s balancing test and conclusion
118
The Frank’s Nursery Court held that
as set forth in Kidder, Peabody.
119
the EEOC could seek both monetary and injunctive relief.
In Frank’s Nursery, the EEOC brought suit on behalf of Carol
Adams, an employee of Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, who had filed a
120
charge of race discrimination with the EEOC. The EEOC filed suit
under Title VII, alleging that Frank’s Nursery failed to promote
121
The EEOC sought: (1) a permanent
Adams based on her race.
injunction to prevent the employer from engaging in race

114. See id. at 812 (relying, as did the Second Circuit, on case law that precludes
monetary relief but allows injunctive relief when the individual previously has
litigated, settled, or waived claims); see also supra notes 70, 78 (noting cases discussing
the preclusive effect of litigation, settlement, or waiver on EEOC monetary remedies,
but permitting injunctive relief).
115. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 813 (remanding to the district court with orders
to dismiss the EEOC’s claims made on behalf of Baker without prejudice and to
permit the EEOC to seek injunctive relief).
116. See supra note 39 (noting language in Gilmer that circuits have relied upon to
support their conclusion that arbitration agreements preclude seeking monetary
damages).
117. 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999), rev’g 966 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
118. See id. at 465 (indicating the court’s disagreement with Kidder, Peabody). It
should be noted that after the Sixth Circuit’s decision, the parties in Frank’s Nursery
reached a private “settlement agreement, preclud[ing] Frank’s Nursery from seeking
[further] review of [the] decision.” EEOC v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 188 F.3d 695,
703 (6th Cir. 1999) (Nelson, J., concurring).
119. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 468 (reserving the district court’s dismissal and
permitting the EEOC to seek both forms of relief).
120. See id. at 452 (describing the circumstances upon which the EEOC filed this
action).
121. See id. at 453 (describing that in its complaint, the EEOC alleged that Frank’s
Nursery had bypassed Adams’s promotion and had unlawfully required Adams and
other applicants to sign and comply with an application for employment that
required arbitration of statutory rights afforded them by Title VII).
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122

(2) a permanent injunction to prevent the
discrimination,
employer
from
using
mandatory
pre-dispute
arbitration
123
agreements, (3) an order requiring the employer to implement
124
anti-discrimination programs, and (4) an order granting “make
whole” relief for Adams, including back pay, compensatory damages,
125
and punitive damages.
Frank’s Nursery countered the EEOC’s complaint and filed
motions to compel Adams to arbitrate her dispute under the terms of
126
127
her employment application and the FAA, and to dismiss the
128
The district court
EEOC’s suit for monetary and injunctive relief.
granted the motion to compel and dismissed the EEOC case in its
129
entirety. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court and held that
an employee’s mandatory arbitration clause does not bind the EEOC
130
to the terms of the employee’s contract. The Sixth Circuit reached

122. See id.
123. See id. On appeal, the EEOC did not pursue its claim that the arbitration
clause was unenforceable, narrowing the issues solely to the scope of remedies
available to the EEOC in an independent suit on behalf of an employee who signed a
mandatory arbitration agreement. See id. at 454-55 & n.4 (noting the EEOC’s
decision not to challenge the enforceability of such agreements even though the
EEOC considers such agreements unenforceable as a matter of federal law). Compare
supra note 9 (citing cases extending the Gilmer rationale, allowing mandatory
arbitration of statutory claims, to Title VII cases), with supra note 33 (collecting cases
and other sources challenging the legitimacy of the Gilmer decision and arguing that
Title VII claims should not be subject to compulsory arbitration).
124. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 453 (noting the EEOC requested that Frank’s
Nursery institute equal opportunity employment practices); see also infra note 49
(describing an affirmative order by the court as a type of injunction).
125. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 453 (noting that Adams did not intervene in
the EEOC’s lawsuit for money damages); see also infra notes 50 (defining back pay
remedy) and 54-55 (defining compensatory and punitive damages remedies).
126. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 452-53 (noting that Adams had signed the
company’s application form which contained a clause agreeing to arbitrate all
disputes arising out of her employment). The arbitration clause stated:
I understand and agree that any claim I may wish to file against the
Company . . . relative to my employment or termination from employment
(including but not limited to any claim for tort, discrimination, breach of
contract, violation of public policy or statutory claim) must . . . be submitted
for binding and final arbitration before the American Arbitration
Association.
Id.
127. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994) (authorizing a party to an arbitration agreement to
seek a court order compelling arbitration under the contract terms).
128. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 453-54 (stating that Frank’s Nursery sought
summary judgment in its favor as “the challenged employment application [was]
enforceable as a matter of law”).
129. See EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 500, 505 (E.D. Mich.
1997) (finding that “to the extent that Adams is bound by her agreement to
arbitrate, so is the EEOC”); see also supra note 63 (explaining that the district court’s
holding permitting the EEOC to seek neither monetary nor injunctive relief has
been rejected by all of the circuits that have addressed the issue).
130. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 455 (noting the specific intent of Congress to
empower the EEOC “to eradicate employment discrimination on behalf of the public
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this conclusion by assessing the EEOC’s authority under the Title VII
131
statutory scheme and legislative history, and by rejecting contentions that the FAA, preclusion, or waiver principles prohibited the
132
EEOC from seeking monetary relief.
First, the Sixth Circuit evaluated the Title VII statute. The court
noted that the statute grants the EEOC 180 days of “exclusive
133
jurisdiction” over a discrimination charge.
The Frank’s Nursery
court reasoned that the EEOC distinguishes between cases where the
agency files its own suit to “vindicate the public interest” against
employment discrimination and cases where the agency permits the
134
employee to decide whether to file suit. In the latter instance, the
135
EEOC will issue a “right to sue” letter to the employee. If the EEOC
does decide to sue, the individual may not file suit as he or she has
136
Therefore, the
merely a right to intervene in the EEOC action.
Sixth Circuit concluded that the EEOC’s right to sue is independent
of the individual’s right to pursue a claim in a judicial or arbitral
137
forum.

interest”).
131. See infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text (explaining the Sixth Circuit’s
analysis of Title VII); see also supra Part I.B (providing an overview of the Title VII
statutory scheme).
132. See infra text accompanying notes 142-45 (describing the Sixth Circuit’s
rejection of preclusion and waiver principles).
133. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 456 (citing Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S.
318, 326 (1980)) (stating that an aggrieved person may sue under the Title VII
statutory scheme “at the expiration of the 180-day period of exclusive EEOC
administrative jurisdiction if the agency has failed to move the case along to the
party’s satisfaction, has reached a determination not to sue, or has reached a
conciliation or settlement agreement with the respondent that the party finds
unsatisfactory”); see also Occidental Life Ins. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 361 (1977)
(“[T]his private right of action does not arise until 180 days after a charge has been
filed”).
134. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 456 (noting the different strategies available to
the EEOC in bringing an employment discrimination suit); see also General Tel., 446
U.S. at 326 (“[T]he EEOC is not merely a proxy for the victims of discrimination . . . .
When the EEOC acts, albeit at the behest of and for the benefit of specific
individuals, it acts also to vindicate the public interest in preventing employment
discrimination.”); Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 368 (“[T]he EEOC does not function
simply as a vehicle for conducting litigation on behalf of private parties”); EEOC v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1359 (6th Cir. 1975) (stating that “the EEOC
represents the public interest when it sues to enforce Title VII, not solely the
interests of the private charging parties”).
135. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 456 (stating that the injured part may not
bring a Title VII action without this “right to sue” letter); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.28(b) (explaining EEOC process for issuing “right to sue” letter to aggrieved
individual).
136. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 456 (noting that the injured party is barred
from filing her own suit whenever “the EEOC choose[s] to sue on its own”); see also
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1998) (stating that the aggrieved party has the right to
intervene in an EEOC initiated action).
137. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 458-59 (“[T]o empower a private individual to
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The Sixth Circuit also based its conclusion on the legislative history
of the 1972 Amendments to Title VII when the court explained that
Congress granted the EEOC the right to sue to increase the agency’s
138
Congress realized that the “failure to
power to enforce Title VII.
grant the EEOC meaningful enforcement powers [had] proven to be
139
a major flaw in the operation of Title VII.”
Furthermore, the
Frank’s Nursery court emphasized the congressional intent “that the
EEOC, not private parties ‘would have complete authority to decide
140
which cases to bring to Federal District court.’”
Therefore, based
on the language of Title VII and the legislative history, the Sixth
Circuit concluded that an arbitration clause cannot divest the EEOC
of its authority to sue when it determines that such suits are necessary
141
to protect the public interest from employment discrimination.
Under the second prong of its analysis, the Frank’s Nursery court
rejected the Second Circuit’s contention that the FAA, preclusion, or
waiver principles prohibited the EEOC from seeking monetary
142
relief.
First, the court correctly held that it could compel neither
143
Adams nor the EEOC to arbitrate under section 4 of the FAA.
Under principles of contract interpretation, the court could not
order Adams to arbitrate because she never filed an individual claim
144
and failed to intervene in the EEOC’s lawsuit. Similarly, the court
could not order the EEOC to arbitrate as the EEOC was not a party to

take away this congressional mandate, by entering into arbitration agreements . . .
would grant that individual the ability to govern whether and when the EEOC may
protect the public interest . . . and thereby undo the work of Congress in its 1972
amendments”).
138. See id. at 456 (noting that Congress wanted to shift responsibility for
“ensuring compliance with Title VII from private individuals to the EEOC”); see also
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 4(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1994)
(stating that the EEOC “is empowered . . . to prevent any person from engaging in
any unlawful employment practice”).
139. Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 457 (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-415, at 4 (1971),
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2148).
140. Id. at 457-58 (quoting EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1361 &
n.12 (6th Cir. 1975) (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 698 (Jan. 21, 1973) (statement of
Senator Domenick)).
141. See supra note 137 (noting the consequences of an interdependent
relationship between the EEOC and the aggrieved party on the right to sue).
142. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 459-67 (providing detailed analysis of why
neither the FAA, preclusion, nor waiver can be used to limit the EEOC’s powers to
receive monetary damages).
143. See id. at 459-60 (noting the court’s holding); see also 9 U.S.C. § 4 (authorizing
motions to compel arbitration).
144. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 460 (stating that the court cannot compel
Adams to arbitrate because “she [has] neither initiated an arbitration nor a federal
lawsuit . . . and has thus not breached her agreement with Frank’s”); see also Volt
Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (indicating that contract
law principles govern enforcement of arbitration agreements).
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145

the arbitration agreement.
Second, the Sixth Circuit held that allowing the EEOC to seek
146
monetary relief would not undermine the FAA or Gilmer. The court
reasoned that when an individual employee files a discrimination
charge and the EEOC decides to sue, “that individual would no
longer possess a private cause of action subject to her prior
agreement to arbitrate. Rather, the EEOC would have a cause of
action on behalf of that individual and the public interest that would
147
fall outside the arbitration agreement.”
Therefore, the court
concluded that the FAA was inapplicable to EEOC enforcement
148
actions under Title VII.
Regarding the principle of preclusion, the Sixth Circuit held that
an employee’s agreement to arbitrate does not have a res judicata
149
effect on a subsequent EEOC suit for monetary relief. The Frank’s
Nursery court distinguished the case law on which the Second Circuit
relied, which held that prior litigation has a res judicata effect on the
150
EEOC’s ability to seek monetary relief on an employee’s behalf.
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that unlike employees who have litigated
fully their claims, Adams did not litigate her claim in a prior judicial
proceeding, nor did she previously arbitrate her claim in an arbitral
151
forum. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that Adams was not in
privity with the EEOC, and therefore, the res judicata principle did
152
not apply.

145. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 460 (noting that “the EEOC . . . never agreed
to arbitrate with Frank’s”); see also supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing
the Fourth Circuit view that the courts cannot compel the EEOC to arbitrate when it
was not a party to a private arbitration agreement).
146. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 461 (noting the court’s reluctance to interpret
Gilmer as a limitation on the EEOC’s right to seek whatever relief it so chooses).
147. Id. at 462.
148. See id. (noting the court’s holding, which relied on provisions in Title VII
creating public and private rights of action and the legislative history of the 1972
amendments).
149. See id. at 463 (deciding that preclusion is not applicable because the EEOC’s
interests are not identical to the aggrieved party’s).
150. See id. at 462-63 (referring to EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286 (7th
Cir. 1993) and EEOC v. United States Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1990)).
These decisions held that a case may be precluded by the existence of a contract or
prior proceeding. See id.
151. See id. at 464 (“[W]e observe that Adams neither filed suit against Frank’s nor
pursued an arbitral remedy against Frank’s that led to a substantive resolution of her
claim of discrimination.”).
152. See id. at 462 (explaining that a nonparty may be bound as a privy by a
previous proceeding where the “relationship between the nonparty and the party is
such as to legally entitle the latter to stand in judgment for the former or where the
nonparty’s interests were adequately represented by a party with the same interests”)
(citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940)); cf. Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446
U.S. 318, 331 (1980) (“[T]he EEOC is authorized to proceed in a unified action and
to obtain the most satisfactory overall relief even though competing interests are
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For similar reasons, the Frank’s Nursery court rejected the election
153
of remedies doctrine to preclude EEOC action for monetary
154
relief.
The court explained that Adams merely exchanged a
judicial forum for an arbitral one when she signed the arbitration
155
The Sixth Circuit
contract; she did not actively pursue a remedy.
concluded that, unlike an individual who actually pursued resolution
of statutory rights through prior litigation or in arbitration, “Adams
therefore stands in the same shoes as an individual who possesses the
156
‘right to sue’ but never files a complaint.”
In addition, the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the Second Circuit’s
assertion in Kidder, Peabody that an agreement to arbitrate has the
same preclusive effect on monetary relief as settlement, waiver, or an
157
158
arbitral award.
To distinguish EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp.
from Adams’s case, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that Adams had not
“received satisfaction of her interests” when she waived her right to a
159
judicial forum in an arbitration agreement.
Therefore, in Frank’s
Nursery, the principles of settlement, waiver, or a prior arbitral award

involved . . . . The individual victim is given his right to intervene for this very
reason.”).
153. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 464 (explaining that the doctrine of election of
remedies applies when “an individual having two coexistent but inconsistent
remedies chooses to exercise one, in which event he loses the right to thereafter
exercise the other”) (citations omitted).
154. See id. (noting the doctrine’s “inapplicability to actions brought under Title
VII”).
155. See id. (“By signing her arbitration agreement, Adams merely traded a judicial
forum for an arbitral one—she did not ‘pursue’ an arbitral remedy just by signing an
agreement to arbitrate in the event that she suffered a violation of her statutory
rights.”); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)
(recognizing that “‘[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo
the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an
arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum’”) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
156. Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 464.
157. See id. at 465 (“[W]e must part company with the Second Circuit to the extent
it would bar the EEOC from suing for both monetary and injunctive relief on behalf
of such an employee.”); see also supra notes 68-76 (explaining the Second Circuit’s
application of settlement and waiver principles to the mandatory arbitration
context).
158. 813 F.2d 1539, 1543 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that even when the EEOC filed
suit first, a later private settlement by the employee waiving her right to back pay
mooted the EEOC’s back pay claim on the employee’s behalf).
159. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 465-66 (distinguishing Goodyear in that Adams
did not reach settlement nor did she voluntarily relinquish her back pay claim); see
also Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Appellant at 20,
Frank’s Nursery (No. 97-1698) [hereinafter EEOC Frank’s Nursery Brief] (“None of
those rationales makes any sense in this case, however, where there has been no
other prior resolution of the charging party’s discrimination claim and no relief has
yet been granted.”); supra note 155 (explaining that under Gilmer, an arbitration
agreement is a waiver of the judicial forum, not a substantive resolution of rights
under the federal statute).
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do not undermine the EEOC’s independent authority to decide
160
whether to file a Title VII suit.
Furthermore, the Frank’s Nursery court raised concerns that the rule
of law adopted by the Second Circuit would reduce incentives to
employers to eliminate and prevent unlawful employment
161
discrimination. Most importantly, the Sixth Circuit recognized that
the Second Circuit’s approach in a Title VII case would undermine
Congress’s recent expansion of monetary remedies available to the
162
EEOC under the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Finally, the Frank’s Nursery court held that an arbitration agreement
163
The
does not preclude the EEOC from seeking injunctive relief.
164
court relied on General Telephone Co. v. EEOC to conclude that the
EEOC may seek class-wide relief based on proof of discrimination
165
against just one employee. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit concluded
that an employee’s agreement to arbitrate does not preclude the
EEOC from seeking both money damages and injunctive relief in a
166
Title VII suit.

160. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 465-66 (disputing the Second Circuit view that
allowing the EEOC to seek monetary relief allows the employee to “‘make an end
run around the arbitration agreement’”) (quoting EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.,
Inc., 156 F.3d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1998)). In contrast, the Sixth Circuit explained:
while Title VII affords recovery through private action or an action by the
EEOC, it does not allow both, and the power to decide which route to follow
rests in the hands of the EEOC, not the aggrieved employee. Since the
statute does not grant an individual the power to obtain recovery without
authorization from the EEOC, such an individual cannot, by making
decisions about her own ability to sue for herself, override the power of the
EEOC to sue in its own name.
Id. at 466.
161. See id. (emphasizing the deterrent effect of monetary relief such as back pay
or compensatory and punitive damages on employers); see also supra notes 50, 54-55
and accompanying text (discussing the purposes of back pay, compensatory, and
punitive damages).
162. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 466 (determining that not allowing monetary
relief like punitive damages would undermine Congress’s intent to strengthen EEOC
enforcement powers as expressed in the Civil Rights Act of 1991); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(a)(1) (1994) (allowing the complaining party, with certain specific
exceptions, to seek compensatory and punitive damages under Title VII); infra notes
210-17 and accompanying text (analyzing the Sixth Circuit’s approach allowing
compensatory and punitive damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
163. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 467 (noting that the EEOC may be entitled to
injunctive relief if it can show intentional discrimination).
164. 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980).
165. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 467 (noting General Telephone’s holding that the
EEOC may receive injunctive relief on behalf of individual claimants); see also supra
note 78 and accompanying text (showing that the EEOC can seek injunctive relief
based on charges of discrimination against one employee).
166. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 468 (permitting the EEOC to seek monetary
and injunctive relief). In a separate opinion, Judge Nelson concurred in part,
agreeing that the EEOC could seek class-wide injunctive relief. See id. at 468 (Nelson,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing with the majority as to
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2. Sixth Circuit: EEOC v. Northwest Airlines
The Sixth Circuit followed its holding in Frank’s Nursery in a recent
167
case, EEOC v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. Northwest Airlines agreed that an
employee’s arbitration agreement does not divest the EEOC of its
independent authority to seek monetary and injunctive relief under
168
Title VII.
The EEOC filed suit against Northwest Airlines in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging intentional racebased discrimination against Gloria Hamilton and class-wide claims of
a racially hostile work environment affecting Hamilton and other
169
African-American employees in violation of Title VII.
The EEOC
also alleged violations of a prior consent decree entered by the U.S.
District Court for the District of Minnesota prohibiting Northwest
170
Airlines from engaging in racial harassment of its employees. The
factual allegations of the EEOC complaint detailed numerous
instances of flagrant racial harassment, including disparaging racial
statements by managers, Ku Klux Klan symbols and racial graffiti
depicting lynchings in the work area, and a noose hanging in the
171
The EEOC also alleged that managers
employee lunch room.
failed to remedy the racial harassment despite repeated complaints
172
from African-American workers.
The EEOC sought (1) an
injunction, (2) compensatory damages, and (3) punitive damages on

general injunctive relief for the EEOC). Judge Nelson dissented in part, however,
from the majority view that the EEOC could seek money damages on behalf of an
employee who signed an arbitration agreement. See id. at 468-69 (Nelson, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating he would have followed the
Second Circuit decision with respect to the money damages sought on behalf of an
employee by the EEOC, and would have found the agreement to arbitrate such
claims enforceable). Judge Nelson argued that the Sixth Circuit should adopt the
rationale in Kidder, Peabody balancing the individual’s right to contract under the
FAA against the EEOC’s interest in preventing employment discrimination under
Title VII. See id. at 469-71 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Agreeing with the Second Circuit, Judge Nelson concluded that allowing the EEOC
to seek only injunctive relief on behalf of individuals who signed arbitration
agreements “‘strikes the right balance between these interests.’” Id. at 471 (Nelson,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody &
Co., 156 F.3d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1998)).
167. 188 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 1999).
168. See id. at 702 (reversing the arbitration order that did not allow the EEOC to
seek relief). Concurring in the judgment, Judge Nelson noted his dissent in Frank’s
Nursery and restated his position that the Sixth Circuit erred in allowing the EEOC to
seek monetary relief. See id. (Nelson, J., concurring) (noting his disagreement with
the majority in the previous Frank’s Nursery decision).
169. See id. at 698.
170. See id. (noting that the EEOC also claimed Northwest did not comply with the
consent decree from Aburime v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., a previous class action lawsuit).
171. See id. at 697-98.
172. See id. at 698 (describing managers’ decisions not to take action against the
alleged offenders under their supervision).
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173

behalf of Hamilton and other employees.
The Michigan court transferred the case to the District of
Minnesota based on the Minnesota court’s jurisdiction over the
174
consent decree claim. The Minnesota court dismissed the consent
decree claim and Hamilton’s individual claim because she had signed
an arbitration agreement with Northwest, but declined to dismiss the
175
class-wide claims.
The Minnesota court then transferred the case
back to the Eastern District of Michigan, where the court entered
176
judgment for Northwest on the class-wide claim.
Relying on Frank’s Nursery, the Sixth Circuit reversed the orders of
both district courts, holding that the EEOC could pursue both
monetary relief for Hamilton and injunctive relief for the class-wide
177
claim.
Summarizing Frank’s Nursery, the court reaffirmed that the
FAA does not apply to the EEOC’s independent right to sue under
Title VII, and that the ability to seek monetary relief does not
178
undermine the FAA.
Furthermore, preclusion does not apply
because Hamilton had not previously litigated or arbitrated her
179
claims. The Northwest Airlines court did not find that an arbitration
agreement would waive EEOC claims because the court determined
that the EEOC has full authority to decide when it will file a Title VII
180
suit.
Finally, the court held that the EEOC could seek class-wide

173. See id. at 699. See generally supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text
(explaining purposes of injunctions, compensatory damages and punitive damages
remedies under Title VII).
174. See Northwest Airlines, 188 F.3d at 699 (describing the transfer of the case to
the District of Minnesota pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), “which allows for transfer
in the district court’s discretion to any other proper district when it furthers the
convenience of parties and witnesses and is in the interest of justice.”).
175. See id. (explaining that the district court treated Northwest’s motion to
dismiss as a motion for summary judgment). The Minnesota court had held that
Hamilton must arbitrate her claim under her arbitration agreement with Northwest,
and that the EEOC could not file suit on Hamilton’s behalf. See id.
176. See id. (reporting how the Minnesota court transferred the remaining EEOC
claim back to the Eastern District of Michigan, which ultimately granted summary
judgment for Northwest Airlines due to the lack of evidence in support of the
putative class claim).
177. See id. at 702-03 (“We leave for the district judge on remand to consider
whether the EEOC can establish a claim for monetary damages for any employees
other than Hamilton in light of Frank’s Nursery.”). The EEOC did not appeal the
Minnesota District Court’s dismissal of the consent decree claims. See id. at 701.
178. See id. at 701 (“We held in Frank’s Nursery that [the FAA] does not apply to
Title VII actions brought by the EEOC on behalf of an employee who has signed an
arbitration agreement.”); see also supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text
(explaining Frank’s Nursery’s rationale regarding the FAA).
179. See Northwest Airlines, 188 F.3d at 701 (refusing to apply preclusion principals
to prevent the EEOC’s suit); see also supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text
(explaining the Frank’s Nursery court’s rejection of preclusion principles).
180. See Northwest Airlines, 188 F.3d at 701 (“We need not fear that employees will
sidestep arbitration agreements by having the EEOC bring suits . . . on their behalf
because the decision whether to pursue a charge rests with the EEOC.”); see also supra
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181

injunctive relief based on Hamilton’s claims alone.
Significantly, Northwest Airlines involved allegations of egregious,
intentional discrimination, where managers failed to respond to
employees’ complaints about Ku Klux Klan symbols and lynching
182
nooses on display in the workplace. As Part IV.C of this Comment
183
argues, Congress added the damage remedies in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 to strengthen the EEOC’s ability to eradicate and deter
184
this type of intentional discrimination in the workplace.
Part III of this Comment illustrates the split among the circuit
courts with respect to the effect of a mandatory arbitration clause on
the ability of the EEOC to seek monetary relief in an independent
185
suit. The Sixth Circuit in Frank’s Nursery and Northwest Airlines held
that an arbitration agreement does not amount to a waiver,
186
Rather, the EEOC has
settlement, or prior litigation of claims.
independent authority to seek both monetary and injunctive
remedies according to the language and legislative history of Title
187
VII.
In contrast, the Second Circuit in Kidder, Peabody, and the
Fourth Circuit in Waffle House contend that allowing the EEOC to
seek monetary relief on behalf of an employee who signed an
188
arbitration agreement undermines the FAA.
Part IV of this
Comment will argue that the Sixth Circuit approach is consistent with
Gilmer and the FAA, and best implements the purposes of Title VII
189
and the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

notes 157-60 and accompanying text (discussing the Frank’s Nursery court’s rejection
of waiver principles).
181. See Northwest Airlines, 188 F.3d at 702 (instructing the lower court, on remand,
to consider class-wide injunctive relief based on Hamilton’s claims); see also supra
notes 163-65 (providing the Frank’s Nursery court’s rationale for allowing injunctive
relief).
182. See Northwest Airlines, 188 F.3d at 697-98 (describing Hamilton’s experiences
with racial slurs, insults, and symbols as well as her managers’ attitudes that she must
deal with these incidents herself).
183. See infra notes 210-17 and accompanying text (elaborating on purposes of
damage remedies in Civil Rights Act of 1991).
184. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994) (providing compensatory and
punitive damages for cases of intentional discrimination in the workplace).
185. See supra Part II (illustrating the lack of consistency in the circuit courts as to
the EEOC’s right to claim monetary relief in instances of a mandatory arbitration
clause).
186. See supra Part II.B (providing the Sixth Circuit’s rationale for finding that an
agreement to arbitrate does not eliminate claims brought by the EEOC).
187. See supra Part II.B (discussing the Sixth Circuit’s decision to allow both
monetary and injunctive remedies for the EEOC).
188. See supra Part II.A (providing the Second and Fourth Circuit’s rationales
concerning the proper scope of EEOC remedies).
189. See infra Part III.C (arguing that the courts should adopt the Sixth Circuit
approach of allowing both monetary damages and injunctive relief).
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III. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuit opinions illustrate two
possible remedial options the EEOC may pursue when it sues on
behalf of an employee who signed a mandatory arbitration
agreement: (1) injunctive relief only, or (2) both monetary and
190
injunctive relief.
The courts should adopt the Sixth Circuit
approach and allow the EEOC to seek both monetary and injunctive
191
relief under Title VII and other federal anti-discrimination statutes.
A. Consensus Regarding Injunctive Relief
The consensus in the circuits permits the EEOC to seek an
injunction to protect the public interest even in cases where an
192
employee has previously litigated, settled, or waived a claim.
Even
the Second and Fourth Circuits, which held that a mandatory
arbitration clause precludes the EEOC from seeking monetary relief
193
under federal anti-discrimination statutes, recognized that the
EEOC protects the public interest through injunctions against future
194
unlawful employment discrimination. Without at least an injunctive
remedy, the EEOC would be divested of all of Title VII’s statutory
remedies, both equitable and damages—an outcome contrary to the
195
plain language of Title VII and its legislative history. The ability to
seek an injunction serves to prevent future violations of Title VII,
benefiting both the injured employee and the class of workers at risk

190. See supra Part II (discussing holdings of Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits
concerning the scope of EEOC remedies); see also supra note 63 (explaining that all
of the circuits reject the district court’s holding in Frank’s Nursery that the EEOC is
precluded from seeking either monetary or injunctive relief). Since all circuits have
rejected the Frank’s Nursery approach, this option does not merit further discussion.
191. See infra Part III.C (arguing courts should adopt the Sixth Circuit rationale).
192. See supra note 81 (collecting cases denying monetary relief when an employee
has previously litigated, settled, or waived a claim, but allowing injunctive relief to
protect the public interest).
193. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 813 (4th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, No. 99-1823, 2001 WL 285799 (Mar. 26, 2001) (holding that EEOC could not
obtain monetary relief for employee who signed mandatory arbitration clause);
EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1998) (establishing that
the EEOC could not seek monetary relief on behalf of employees who signed a
mandatory arbitration clause).
194. See, e.g., EEOC v. Massey Yardley Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 117 F.3d 1244, 1253
(11th Cir. 1997) (“[T]here would be little point in [the EEOC] having the
independent power to sue if it could not obtain relief beyond that fashioned for the
individual claimant.”); see also supra text accompanying notes 85-88 (explaining the
Second Circuit’s rationale for allowing injunctive relief); supra note 114 (indicating
that the Fourth Circuit adopted the Second Circuit rationale).
195. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 325 (1980) (indicating that
Congress passed the 1972 amendments to Title VII because the “failure to grant the
EEOC meaningful enforcement powers has proven to be a major flaw in the
operation of Title VII”) (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-415, at 4 (1971)).
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196

Furthermore, the EEOC’s access to
for future discrimination.
injunctive relief protects the public interest by subjecting employers
to the court’s contempt power if they refuse to comply with the
197
injunction.
B. Only Injunctive Relief
Presently, the law in the Second and Fourth Circuits, based on the
198
Supreme Court’s decision in Gilmer, is that a mandatory arbitration
clause precludes the EEOC from seeking monetary relief on behalf of
an employee, thereby making injunctive relief the EEOC’s only
199
available remedy.
This view purports to strike the proper balance
between the public interest in eliminating employment
discrimination and the enforcement of the private right to contract
200
under the FAA. As critics have noted, however, the Gilmer opinion
does not support the contention that an arbitration clause precludes
201
the EEOC from seeking monetary relief.
In addition, preclusion

196. See Massey Yardley, 117 F.3d at 1253 (“[T]he EEOC represents the public
interest when litigating claims, and, through injunctive relief, seeks to protect not
only the rights of the individual claimant, but those of similarly-situated employees by
deterring the employer from future discrimination.”) (citations omitted). See
generally DOBBS, supra note 48, at 532-34 (explaining that the equitable remedy of
injunction is used extensively in civil rights cases to provide temporary or permanent
relief to individuals and groups); ROBERT N. LEAVELL ET AL., EQUITABLE REMEDIES,
RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES 14-17 (5th ed. 1994) (explaining that one purpose of an
injunction is to prevent future loss of an entitlement). The court will only issue a
permanent injunction when the plaintiff can show a likelihood that the defendant
will violate a right in the future, and that there is no adequate remedy at law because
the injury is not adequately compensated in damages. See id. at 81. District courts
typically fashion equitable remedies, such as the injunction, because they are more
familiar with the underlying facts than a reviewing court and can better weigh the
equities. See id. at 42.
197. See DOBBS, supra note 48, at 105 (explaining enforcement of the injunctive
remedy through the contempt power of the court, in which an employer can be
jailed, fined, or precluded from litigating an issue if it refuses to comply with a court
order).
198. See supra Part I.A (analyzing the Gilmer decision and its enforcement of
mandatory arbitration for federal statutory anti-discrimination claims under the
FAA).
199. See supra notes 68-84 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit’s
reliance on Gilmer and the FAA policy favoring enforcement of arbitration
agreements); supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing the Fourth Circuit’s
adoption of the Second Circuit’s rationale).
200. See supra notes 113-15 (striking a balance between enforcing arbitration
agreements and the EEOC’s right to sue).
201. See supra notes 37-42 (describing the context of the Gilmer language stating
that the EEOC can still seek injunctive relief on behalf of an employee who signed an
arbitration agreement); see also supra note 86 (showing that the Second Circuit relied
on the text of Gilmer to limit the EEOC to injunctive relief). But see Estreicher, supra
note 8, at 1374 & nn.98-99 (disputing that Gilmer resolved the issue of whether the
EEOC can seek only injunctive relief). For an analysis that supports mandatory
arbitration, but critiques the Kidder, Peabody decision as unsound, see David Sherwyn
et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing
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principles do not apply in cases like Frank’s Nursery where the
employee’s interests were not satisfied through prior litigation or
202
arbitration.
The relevant question regarding the “injunction only” option is
whether the injunctive remedy is sufficient to serve the public
interest. The United States Supreme Court has expressed doubt that
the injunctive remedy alone is sufficient to deter employers from
203
violating Title VII. In Albemarle Paper, the Court indicated that the
primary objective of Title VII was to promote equal employment
opportunities by removing barriers from the past and by preventing
204
future discrimination.
The Albemarle Paper Court recognized,
however, that monetary remedies such as back pay were critical to

Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
73, 116-18 (1999) (considering the Kidder, Peabody interpretation of the Gilmer
decision).
First, Sherwyn argues that Kidder, Peabody is incorrect from a legal standpoint
because the court takes Gilmer’s statements regarding the EEOC’s ability to seek
injunctive relief out of context. See id. at 117 (arguing that the Kidder, Peabody
interpretation of Gilmer is erroneous because it ignores Gilmer’s statement that
employees may still file claims with the EEOC, and holds without any basis that Gilmer
allows the EEOC to bring a lawsuit only when seeking class-wide and equitable
relief). Sherwyn states:
It is spurious to assume that a class-wide action seeking equitable relief
represents the sole occasion upon which the EEOC may pursue a lawsuit on
behalf of employees who have signed an arbitration agreement. Such an
analysis goes beyond the Court’s plain language and is inconsistent with the
Court’s statement that an employee may still file charges with the EEOC . . .
The EEOC’s only power is the threat of a lawsuit. If a lawsuit is not possible,
there is no incentive for an employer to cooperate with the EEOC in its
investigations and conciliation processes.
Id. at 117-18.
Second, Sherwyn argues that Kidder, Peabody is incorrect from a policy standpoint
because allowing the EEOC to go to court and seek full statutory relief is necessary to
maintain the relevance of the agency and to allow implementation of the agency’s
national enforcement plan. See id. at 118 (maintaining that a private arbitration
agreement should not prevent the EEOC from using the courts and obtaining
relief). The EEOC also argued in Frank’s Nursery that Gilmer was misinterpreted and
did not stand for the proposition that the EEOC could only seek class-wide injunctive
relief. See EEOC Frank’s Nursery Brief, supra note 159, at 22 (arguing that the district
court misconstrued Gilmer’s statement that “arbitration agreements will not preclude
the EEOC from bringing actions seeking class-wide and equitable relief” to mean
that the EEOC could only pursue class claims and obtain injunctive relief where
employees had signed an arbitration agreement).
202. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (explaining the Sixth Circuit’s
rejection of preclusion principles when the employee has not received a prior benefit
in litigation or arbitration).
203. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (noting that the
mere prospect of an injunctive order is not sufficient to make employers stop
questionably legal practices, but a threat of a monetary award will cause employers to
review their employment practices); see also infra note 215 (discussing the Supreme
Court’s view that an injunctive remedy alone is insufficient to deter discrimination,
and that the prospect of monetary relief is necessary).
204. See Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 417 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 429-30 (1971)) (discussing the primary objective of Title VII).
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achieving this purpose by providing the necessary incentive to
205
employers to change their discriminatory practices. Indeed, Judge
Feinberg raised the very same concern in his concurring opinion in
Kidder, Peabody when he disagreed with the majority’s assumption that
the deterrent value of an arbitration award is equal to the deterrent
206
value of monetary relief in an EEOC action.
Statistical data on monetary awards in civil actions compared to
arbitration validate Feinberg’s concerns. In a study evaluating the
207
mean damages awarded in American Arbitration Association (AAA)
arbitrations compared to federal district court cases, researchers
found that the mean damages awarded in AAA arbitrations totaled
208
$49,030, compared to $530,611 in federal civil actions.
Based on
such statistics, it is likely that the threat of a large award in an EEOC
suit would have a stronger deterrent effect on employers than
209
multiple, smaller arbitration awards.

205. See id. at 417-18 (noting that the threat of a back pay award is necessary to
cause employers to consider their actions). The Albemarle Paper Court recognized:
If employers faced only the prospect of an injunctive order, they would have
little incentive to shun practices of dubious legality. It is the reasonably
certain prospect of a back pay award that “provide(s) the spur or catalyst
which causes employers . . . to self-evaluate their employment practices and
to endeavor to eliminate . . . [discrimination].
Id. (quoting United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)).
206. 152 F.3d 298, 304 (2d Cir. 1998) (Feinberg, J., concurring) (arguing that the
risk and resulting deterrent value of a single large award in an EEOC case brought
on behalf of multiple employees would be greater than that of multiple smaller
awards obtained by employees through arbitration); supra note 90 and
accompanying text (discussing Judge Feinberg’s view that the threat of a large award
in EEOC litigation has a greater deterrent effect than multiple smaller arbitration
awards).
207. See Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, in
ARBITRATION NOW: OPPORTUNITIES FOR FAIRNESS, PROCESS RENEWAL AND INVIGORATION
1, 4 (Paul H. Haagen ed., 1999) (finding that as of 1997, the AAA administered
private arbitration plans covering over three million employees); see also Mackenzie &
Zuchlewski, supra note 33, at 45 (stating that the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) is a major private arbitration service provider).
208. See Maltby, supra note 207, at 17-18 (discussing mean damages awarded in
AAA arbitration). Calculated as a percentage of damages demanded, the mean
damages received from arbitration were 25% of the total amount demanded, while
the mean damages received from litigation were 70% of the amount demanded. See
id. at 18.
209. See supra notes 55-55 (exploring the deterrent effect of monetary damages).
The same AAA study, however, also demonstrates the benefits of arbitration to
employee-plaintiffs. See Maltby, supra note 207, at 18. Plaintiffs win more often in
AAA arbitrations (63%) than in litigation (14.9%), and as a percentage of demand
awarded to all plaintiffs (not just successful plaintiffs), arbitration awards (18%)
actually exceed litigation awards (10.4%). See id.; see also Paul H. Haagen, New
Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIZ.
L. REV. 1039, 1055 (1998) (citing a government commission’s report indicating that
litigation entails high costs and long delays that may be burdensome on low wage
workers); John W. R. Murray, Note, The Uncertain Legacy of Gilmer: Mandatory
Arbitration of Federal Employment Discrimination Claims, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281, 295-
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In addition to the insufficient deterrent effect of the injunction
only option, as recently as 1991, Congress affirmatively recognized
that additional remedies were needed to eliminate and prevent
210
Congress added compensatory and
employment discrimination.
punitive damage remedies to the traditional equitable remedies
211
available under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act
212
213
(ADA) in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The plain language of the
1991 Act states, “Congress finds that . . . additional remedies under
Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional
214
discrimination in the workplace.” In addition, the legislative history
of the 1991 Act shows that Congress was aware of the Albemarle Paper
215
Co. v. Moody case when it approved damage remedies to enhance
216
the deterrent effect of Title VII remedies. Particularly, the prospect

97 (1999) (explaining that arbitration saves time and money for the average
employee compared to the time and expense of filing a charge with the EEOC and
following the case through district courts crowded with discrimination claims).
210. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994)) (providing additional remedies
under federal law to deter discrimination in the workplace).
211. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994) (as amended); see also supra notes
48-51 (describing traditional equitable remedies available under Title VII prior to
1991 Act).
212. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994) (setting forth remedies available to a person
who proves discrimination on the basis of disability).
213. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (providing the complaining party with the right
to recover compensatory and punitive damages). Although plaintiffs suing under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) cannot seek compensatory and
punitive damages under the 1991 Act, they can still seek liquidated damages, an
amount equal to lost compensation, in addition to back pay in cases of willful
discrimination. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); see also LEWIS, supra note 50, at 317-19
(comparing Title VII and ADEA remedies, and concluding that the ADEA plaintiff
may still be able to recover more than the Title VII plaintiff in cases against smaller
employers, without the caps on damages found in the 1991 Act).
214. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994) (Congressional
Findings).
215. 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (articulating the Supreme Court’s position that
the prospect of monetary relief is necessary to deter employers from engaging in
employment discrimination); see also supra note 205 (describing the Albemarle Paper
Court’s view that an injunction alone is insufficient to deter employers from the
unlawful discrimination of employees).
216. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 69 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,
607. Articulating the purposes of the 1991 Act, the House Committee on Education
and Labor found “a compelling need to permit the recovery of damages under Title
VII” to serve three purposes: enhancing Title VII’s effectiveness by making victims of
intentional discrimination whole, deterring future discrimination, and encouraging
enforcement of the statute by private parties. See id. at 64-70. Additionally, the
House Committee on Education and Labor cited Albemarle Paper in support for their
conclusion that damage remedies are needed because often back pay is often
insufficient to compensate victims for injuries. See id. at 69 (also noting that back pay
has not served as an effective deterrent). The committee stated:
Back pay as the exclusive monetary remedy under Title VII has not served as
an effective deterrent, and when back pay is not available, as is the case
where a discrimination victim remains on-the-job or leaves the workplace for
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of punitive damages, awarded by the jury in a civil case, would create
217
a strong deterrent effect among employers.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 also contains section 118, a provision
that encourages the use of alternative dispute resolution, including
arbitration, to resolve disputes under the federal laws amended by
218
the Act.
Some scholars have interpreted section 118 broadly to
mean that Congress did not intend for federal statutory
219
discrimination claims to be subject to mandatory arbitration at all.

other reasons other than discrimination, there is simply no deterrent.
Id. For additional discussion of the 1991 Act’s damage provisions’ impact on EEOC
enforcement powers, see generally Livingston, supra note 7, at 53-72 (reviewing the
punitive damage provisions of the 1991 Act and evaluating their impact on EEOC
enforcement powers).
217. See supra notes 55-57. Based on the high level of proof required to obtain
punitive damages and the caps on damages in the statute, the House Committee
rejected as having no merit any contention that jury awards under the 1991 Act
would be disproportional to the harm caused. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 72-73
(noting that sufficient procedural impediments exist to ensure that large awards will
be granted only in the most deserving of cases). The Committee stated:
Just as they have for hundreds of years, juries are fully capable of
determining whether an award of damages is appropriate and if so, how
large it must be to compensate the plaintiff adequately and to deter future
repetition of the prohibited conduct. In any case, the procedural and
substantive limitations set forth above serve to check jury discretion in
awarding such damages. Judges serve as an additional check: they can and
do reduce awards which are disproportionate to the defendant’s
discriminatory conduct or the plaintiff’s resulting loss . . . . Of course,
substantial awards may be both necessary and appropriate in some cases in
order to compensate the victim fully for his or her injuries, or to ensure that
the employer is deterred from engaging in future acts of discrimination.
Id.
218. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 118, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994) (Alternative
Means of Dispute Resolution) (“Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by
law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement
negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and
arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of
Federal law amended by this title.”).
219. See Murray, supra note 209, at 302-04 (arguing that § 118 provides a strong
argument that statutory claims under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA are not
subject to compulsory arbitration). Murray cites the following passage from the
House Committee reports:
[T]he use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is intended to
supplement, not supplant, the remedies provided by Title VII. Thus, for
example, the Committee believes that any agreement to submit disputed
issues to arbitration, whether in the context of a collective bargaining
agreement or in an employment contract, does not preclude the affected
person from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of Title VII.
This view is consistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII
in Alexander v. Garner-Denver Co . . . .
H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 97; see also Mark L. Adams, Compulsory Arbitration of
Discrimination Claims and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Encouraged or Proscribed?, 44
WAYNE L. REV. 1619, 1637-56 (1999) (conducting a thorough analysis of the impact of
the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and concluding that Congress
did not intend for section 118 to require compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims).
But see George Nicolau, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: Its Ramifications
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At the very least, however, section 118 demonstrates that Congress
viewed the provisions strengthening the EEOC’s enforcement powers
through compensatory and punitive damages as consistent with
220
It would
alternative dispute resolution, including arbitration.
undermine congressional efforts to bolster the EEOC’s enforcement
powers if employers could avoid the new damage remedies simply by
placing mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts or
221
application forms. In addition, it is also significant that the Second
and Fourth Circuits did not consider evidence of congressional intent
under section 118 to increase the remedies available to combat
222
employment discrimination.
C. Both Monetary and Injunctive Relief
Concerns about meaningful implementation of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 and the inadequate deterrent effect of injunctive relief alone
both demonstrate that the EEOC needs monetary relief to adequately
223
address the make-whole and deterrent purposes of Title VII.
Therefore, the Sixth Circuit’s decision to allow the EEOC to seek
both monetary and injunctive relief is necessary to guarantee the
EEOC’s effective enforcement of Title VII and other federal anti224
discrimination statutes. The courts should adopt the Sixth Circuit’s
approach because it best implements the congressional intent of Title
VII and the 1991 Act, and it is consistent with Gilmer and the FAA.
This approach also best fulfills the purposes of the damage

and Implications for Employees, Employers and Practitioners, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177,
189 (1998) (indicating that it is unclear under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 whether
the arbitration provisions support mandatory arbitration, or only voluntary
arbitration).
220. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that
the House Report on section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 “explained that the
purpose of that section was to increase the possible remedies available to civil rights
plaintiffs”); see also Adams, supra note 219, at 1637-40 (arguing the legislative history
of the 1991 Act shows that Congress intended the provision on alternative dispute
resolution techniques to increase, not decrease, remedies available under Title VII).
221. Given the widespread and increasing use of arbitration agreements, such a
result would seriously undermine the EEOC’s enforcement powers because
employers will have established a “private justice system.” See Maltby, supra note 207,
at 4 (indicating that in 1979 only 1% of employers used private arbitration,
increasing in 1995 to 10%, and rising to 19% in 1997, the latter figures representing
an increase of nearly 90% in two years).
222. See Karen Halverson, Arbitration and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 67 U. CIN. L.
REV. 445, 446 (1999) (stating that section 118 of the 1991 Act endorses the use of
arbitration under various anti-discrimination statutes, including Title VII, the ADA,
and the ADEA); see also supra Part II.A (explaining the Second and Fourth Circuit
rationales for limiting the EEOC to injunctive relief).
223. See supra Part III.B (showing the inadequacy of injunctive relief alone).
224. See supra Part II.B (discussing the Sixth Circuit’s rationale for allowing both
monetary and injunctive relief).
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remedies—to compensate victims and to deter future discrimination.
The language of Title VII supports the Sixth Circuit interpretation
that the EEOC has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether to file
an employment discrimination suit and, if so, sever the employee’s
225
right to file an individual claim. The aggrieved employee, however,
226
maintains the right to intervene in the EEOC action.
The EEOC
should be able to sue for monetary and injunctive relief on behalf of
an employee who has signed an arbitration agreement, but does not
pursue arbitration.
The EEOC’s ability to sue under such
circumstances would be similar to the agency’s ability to sue for
monetary and injunctive relief on behalf of an employee who has a
right to sue in court, but does not initiate a private suit or intervene
227
in an EEOC proceeding.
As a practical matter, the Sixth Circuit’s decision ensures
meaningful enforcement of federal civil rights laws. This precedent
would not allow employees to make an “end run” around the
228
arbitration agreement.
In his concurring opinion in Kidder,
Peabody, Judge Feinberg argued that the EEOC has limited resources
229
and would pursue monetary relief only when appropriate. Statistics
from 1993 indicate that the EEOC only filed an independent suit in
230
418 out of 87,942 complaints filed, less than 1 percent of charges.
Furthermore, government reports estimate that the EEOC has a
231
232
backlog ranging from 74,541 to 111,000 cases. As these practical
considerations demonstrate, the EEOC receives thousands of
complaints, has limited resources, and only files suit in a small

225. See supra Part I.B (providing an overview of the Title VII statutory scheme); see
also supra notes 133-37 (explaining the Sixth Circuit’s application of the Title VII
statutory scheme in Frank’s Nursery).
226. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1994); see also supra note 44-46 (articulating the
amended Title VII statutory scheme).
227. As aptly stated by the Frank’s Nursery court, “Adams therefore stands in the
same shoes as an individual who possesses the ‘right to sue’ but never files a
complaint.” 177 F.3d 448, 464 (6th Cir. 1999).
228. See EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 156 F.3d 298, 304 (2d Cir. 1998)
(Feinberg, J., concurring) (challenging the majority’s contention that allowing
monetary relief would amount to an “end run” around the arbitration clause since,
given the EEOC’s limited resources, it would likely not pursue an employee claim
just to allow the employee to avoid arbitration).
229. See id. (Feinberg, J., concurring) (“I do not think it likely that the EEOC will
pursue monetary damages simply to accommodate employees seeking to avoid
arbitration . . . .”).
230. See Maltby, supra note 207, at 29 & n.164 (noting that most employees
wronged by their employers will never seek justice).
231. See id. at 28 & n.157 (quoting EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
SUMMARY OF ENFORCEMENT DATA AND BUDGET AND STAFFING INFORMATION, FY 19911996).
232. See Halverson, supra note 222, at 460 & n.93 (citing EEOC backlog figures
from 1995 to show that the EEOC operates under severe budget constraints).
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233

number of cases. Under these circumstances, it is unreasonable to
assume that the thousands of employees who entered into arbitration
agreements reasonably can expect the EEOC to litigate their claims
234
in order to avoid arbitration under the FAA.
The power to seek damage remedies also allows the EEOC to
combat egregious or repeated acts of discrimination by employers
235
that may not be deterred by smaller arbitration awards.
Northwest
Airlines illustrates the situation in which the EEOC may need to seek
the full range of legal damages authorized by the Civil Rights Act of
236
1991 for two reasons.
First, the EEOC’s 1991 Act Enforcement
237
weigh several factors to determine whether an
Guidelines
238
employer’s conduct shows the “malice or reckless indifference”
required to seek punitive damages for intentional discrimination,
including: the degree of egregiousness and nature of the employer’s
239
conduct, the severity of the harm, duration of harm, presence of
past discriminatory conduct by the employer, and the employer’s
240
remedial actions after being informed of the discrimination.

233. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment
Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 425 (1999) (explaining that the
EEOC is only able to take a “small fraction” of its cases to court because of rising
backlogs and budget reductions and has adopted a priority system to help it manage
cases); see also Halverson, supra note 222, at 460 & n.93 (noting that the EEOC has
continued operations despite severe budgetary constraints, which, adjusted for
inflation, actually show a decreasing budget for the agency since 1990). One reason
for the budgetary limitations is that Congress has charged the EEOC with
enforcement of three additional statutes since 1990, including the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994), the Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.), and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654
(1994). See Halverson, supra note 222, at 460 & n.92 (noting the EEOC operates
under budget constraints since enforcement duties have increased while the
commission budget has decreased in inflation adjusted terms).
234. See EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 156 F.3d 298, 304 (2d Cir. 1998)
(Feinberg, J., concurring) (concluding that given the EEOC’s limited resources and
the resulting fact that EEOC can pursue only limited claims, allowing the EEOC to
seek monetary remedies would not actually undermine the FAA).
235. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (stating Judge Feinberg’s
contention in his concurring opinion in Kidder, Peabody that the threat of a large
award in an EEOC suit would have a far greater deterrent effect than multiple
smaller arbitration awards); see also supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text
(providing statistical evidence supporting Feinberg’s position).
236. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the Sixth Circuit’s rationale in Northwest
Airlines for allowing the EEOC to seek both monetary and injunctive relief under
Title VII on behalf of an employee who signed a mandatory arbitration agreement).
237. See EEOC DAMAGES GUIDANCE, supra note 54 (setting forth the EEOC’s
guidelines on the availability of compensatory and punitive damages).
238. See supra note 55 (explaining the “malice or reckless indifference” standard
for punitive damages).
239. The EEOC defines egregious conduct as conduct that shocks or offends the
conscience. See EEOC DAMAGES GUIDANCE, supra note 54, at 16.
240. See id. at 16-18 (listing other factors including evidence of a cover-up and
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All of these factors arguably were met in the Northwest Airlines case,
in which shocking, race-based statements and symbols were used in
the workplace over an extended period of time, with insufficient
remedial response from the employer and evidence that Northwest
Airlines had problems with racial harassment in the past based on a
241
To meet the statutory
consent decree issued in a previous case.
goals of the 1991 Act, the EEOC should be able to seek monetary
242
damages in such cases.
Second, the policy goals of the punitive damages remedy warrant
public, judicial resolution of this type of case, not only to deter
Northwest Airlines, but more importantly, to deter other employers
243
who would learn by example.
Under EEOC enforcement
guidelines, the court also may consider the employer’s size and
financial position, so that the magnitude of the punitive award will
sufficiently deter the employer charged and other similar
244
As the EEOC argued in the Northwest Airlines case,
employers.
mandatory arbitration clauses should not undermine the statutory
and policy justifications for allowing the EEOC to seek punitive
245
damages under Title VII.

proof of retaliation.). See generally Rhonda M. Taylor, In Search of the Appropriate
Standard for Awarding Punitive Damages Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981A—Kolstad v. American
Dental Ass’n, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 763, 770-74 (2000) (explaining the standards for
awarding punitive damages in Title VII cases).
241. See Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Appellant at
4-12, EEOC v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 188 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-1667)
[hereinafter Northwest Airlines Brief] (providing detailed evidence of alleged
repeated racial harassment problems at Northwest Airlines) (on file with American
University Law Review).
242. See supra text accompanying note 184 (advancing the Sixth Circuit’s
argument that the 1991 Act envisioned monetary damages as a form of relief for
aggrieved employees).
243. See Moohr, supra note 233, at 430-32 (explaining that awarding punitive
damages serves the dual purpose of deterring the current violator, and more
importantly, potential violators). Stressing the importance of the general deterrent
effect of a punitive damages award, Moohr cautioned that: “[p]otential violators can
appreciate the threat of sanctions only when they learn that similarly situated actors
have been punished . . . . The public forum of litigation makes this information
available to the parties, to entities similar to the parties, and to the general public.”
Id. at 431. Therefore, public litigation furthers the policy goal of general deterrence
and education of potential violators but arbitration, conducted in private, does not.
See id. at 431-32.
244. See id. at 431 (explaining that public knowledge of the size of the punitive
damages award enables other potential violators to “ calculate the costs and benefits
of engaging in the prohibited conduct”) (citations omitted).
245. See Northwest Airlines Brief, supra note 244, at 27 (discussing the destructive
impact that allowing a mandatory arbitration clause to override the EEOC
enforcement powers would have on the statutory and policy justifications behind the
damages provided for under title VII). Referring to Congress’ intent under the 1991
Act to strengthen the EEOC’s ability to deter employment discrimination through
money damages, the EEOC appealed the decision of the district court denying
monetary (and equitable) relief, stating:
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Another benefit of the Sixth Circuit approach is that it provides a
safeguard against arbitration agreements that do not provide the full
246
The Gilmer Court stated that “‘[s]o
range of statutory remedies.
long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her]
statutory cause of action, in the arbitral forum, the statute will
247
continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.’”
Allowing the substantive rights of Title VII to be enforced in private
arbitration, however, raises concerns about the remedies available
248
during arbitration.
Unless the arbitration agreement allows the
arbitrator to award the full remedies under the statute, the results of
arbitration may not adequately address the remedial and deterrent
249
functions of Title VII. The Sixth Circuit approach allows the EEOC
to seek both monetary and injunctive relief to ensure vindication of
statutory rights when arbitration agreements do not incorporate full

If the district court’s ruling were upheld, it would effectively disarm the
Commission as an enforcement agency. By the simple expedient of
adopting an arbitration policy, employers could guarantee that the
Commission . . . could not recover any monetary or equitable relief in an
enforcement action—even though such relief is expressly provided in Title
VII and the 1991 Civil Rights Act—regardless of how egregiously the statute
were violated.
Id.
246. See EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 156 F.3d 298, 304 (2d Cir. 1998)
(Feinberg, J., concurring) (expressing doubt about the majority’s assumption that
federal statutory rights can be equally vindicated in the arbitral forum); see also
LEAVELL ET AL., supra note 196, at 1131-33 (explaining that the remedies the
arbitrator may award are determined by the terms of the parties’ agreement, and that
the availability of punitive damages is a highly contested issue); Mackenzie &
Zuchlewski, supra note 33, at 39-42 (observing that in the post-Gilmer era, courts have
shifted their focus to whether the arbitral forum provides for due process, or a fair
and full vindication of federal statutory rights).
247. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985))
(alterations in original).
248. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-39 (4th Cir. 1999)
(refusing to enforce a one-sided arbitration agreement in which the employer
selected the arbitrators, completely controlled the arbitration proceedings, and did
not allow for full statutory remedies under Title VII); Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc.,
148 F.3d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1998) (declaring arbitration agreements that do not
provide procedures allowing a full vindication of statutory rights to be
unenforceable).
249. See Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(identifying availability of full statutory remedies as an essential element of due
process in the arbitration context); see id. at 1480 (quoting AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL RULES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 32(c)
(1996)) (“The arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems
just and equitable, including, but not limited to, any remedy or relief that would
have been available to the parties had the matter been heard in court.”); Estreicher,
supra note 8, at 1349-50 (citing the Departments of Commerce and Labor
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations (“Dunlop
Commission”) report, which identifies “a range of remedies equal to those available
through litigation” as an essential safeguard in the abritral forum).
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250

statutory remedies.
Judicial concern over the remedies available in the arbitral forum
counters the Second and Fourth Circuit’s contention that an
251
arbitration agreement functions like a waiver agreement.
Under
the waiver analogy, if an employee can waive his or her right to file a
claim in court or to receive benefits from an EEOC law suit, then the
arbitration agreement also functions as a waiver of the right to
receive individual benefits in federal court personally or through an
252
EEOC suit.
This logic conflicts with the Gilmer Court’s
determination that “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a
party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it
only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
253
forum.”
Unless the arbitral forum provides for full statutory
remedies, including compensatory and punitive damages as well as
injunctive relief, it is unclear how Gilmer’s requirement of full
vindication of statutory rights in the arbitral forum will be met.
Finally, under the Sixth Circuit approach, the district courts also
retain judicial discretion to award back pay, an equitable monetary
254
255
remedy, in the interests of fairness.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the
Supreme Court stated that “in equity, as nowhere else, courts eschew
rigid absolutes and look to the practical realities and necessities
256
inescapably involved in competing interests” An arbitration clause
should not divest the courts of the authority granted in the initial
Title VII statute to award equitable monetary relief in the form of
back pay to employees who did not file an arbitration suit because

250. See Adams, supra note 219, at 1675. Adams explains that even if the
arbitration procedure allows compensatory and punitive damages, the arbitrator may
be reluctant to award them because the employer would be less likely to select the
arbitrator in subsequent arbitrations. See id. Therefore, litigation should still be an
option for the EEOC to protect procedural and substantive rights when the
arbitration process does not provide sufficient protection of those rights. See id.
251. See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit’s
view that an arbitration agreement functions like a waiver or settlement); see also
supra note 114 (indicating that the Fourth Circuit adopted the Second Circuit’s
rationale).
252. See supra notes 68-81 and accompanying text (describing how the Second
Circuit’s view of arbitration agreements limits employee’s substantive statutory
rights); see also supra notes 91-113 (detailing the Fourth Circuit’s concurrence with
the Second Circuit’s view of arbitration agreements).
253. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
254. See supra note 50 (explaining that back pay, an equitable remedy in the
original Title VII statute, is awarded by the court in interest of fairness).
255. 411 U.S. 192, 201 (1973).
256. Id. Similarly, in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, the Court stated, “[i]t is true that
‘[e]quity eschews mechanical rules . . . [and] depends on flexibility.’” 422 U.S. 405,
417 (1975) (citations omitted).
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they were intimidated, uninformed, or lacked the resources to do so.
CONCLUSION
The courts should adopt the Sixth Circuit’s approach and permit
the EEOC to seek monetary and injunctive relief. This approach best
implements the congressional intent underlying Title VII and the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, and is fully consistent with the Gilmer
257
The Sixth Circuit’s decision promotes the
decision and the FAA.
dual purposes of the damage remedies—to compensate victims and
258
to deter future discrimination.
As Congress intended, the EEOC
should be able to seek compensatory and punitive damages to ensure
specific compliance by an employer who violated Title VII and to
259
prevent similar violations by other employers in the future.
The
Sixth Circuit’s approach also provides a safeguard against arbitration
260
agreements that do not provide the full range of statutory remedies.
Most importantly, the Sixth Circuit’s opinion, which enables the
EEOC to seek both monetary and injunctive relief on behalf of
employees bound to arbitration agreements, preserves the EEOC’s
261
authority to eradicate and deter employment discrimination.


257. See supra Parts III.B and III.C (explaining the benefits of the Sixth Circuit
rationale).
258. See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text (supporting the deterrent
effect of the Sixth Circuit approach).
259. See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text (discussing the compensatory
and deterrent intent of congress’ grant to the EEOC of such remedies).
260. See supra notes 246-50 (outlining judicial concerns about the lack of full
statutory remedies available in the arbitral forum).
261. See supra Part I.B (explaining Congress’ intent to strengthen the powers of
the EEOC with the 1972 amendments to the Title VII statutory scheme).

